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ABSTRACT 
The continuity theory of dreaming proposes that waking and dreaming rely on a shared 
set of brain-mind processes.  Research in the fields of lucid dreaming and mindfulness suggest 
continuity of certain neurocognitive processes.  Specifically, the high levels of attention, 
reflection, self-awareness, volition, and control which are hypothesized to be related to lucidity 
are presumed here to be continuous with waking mindfulness.  This study aimed to investigate 
relationships between: 1) Mindfulness in waking and lucidity/mindfulness in dreaming; 2) 
Neuropsychological functions related to mindfulness and lucidity/mindfulness in dreaming; and 
3) Neuropsychological functions and subjective mindfulness in waking.  
N = 44 participants completed measures of general and recent mindfulness skills and a 
battery of neuropsychological tests.  Each morning for seven days following this initial 
assessment, participants rated their levels of lucidity, cognitive functioning, sensory and 
emotional intensity from their preceding night’s dream.  Relationships between waking 
mindfulness levels, neuropsychological functions, and dream variables were evaluated using a 
correlational design. 
Waking mindfulness did not account for a significant amount of variance in dream 
lucidity, but did account for a significant amount of variance in dream mindfulness.  Correlations 
between dream lucidity and neuropsychological measures were not significant.  However, better 
performances on two neuropsychological measures (sustained attention and behavioral self-
monitoring) were moderately correlated with dream mindfulness.  Also, general mindful 
awareness and recent mindful acceptance were positively associated with sustained attention 
and behavioral self-monitoring. 
Significant relationships found between waking mindfulness and dream mindfulness 
provide support for continuity theory.  Mindfulness appears to be expressed in dreams to a 
degree that is consistent with recent and general levels of mindful awareness.  The relationships 
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between neuropsychological functions and dream mindfulness suggest a shared brain bases for 
attention and behavioral self-monitoring across dreaming and waking.  The failure to find a 
relationship between lucidity and any of the variables assessed in waking in this study may be 
due to methodological limitations.  Alternatively, while high levels of attention, reflection, volition, 
self-awareness, and control are often observed in lucid dreams, they may not be exclusive to 
lucid dreams.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
In the simplest terms, lucid dreaming is a state in which the dreamer recognizes that he 
or she is dreaming, while dreaming (Brown, 1936).  This state represents a unique blend of 
waking and dreaming consciousness in which an individual can be observed in a state of 
physiological sleep but is able to experience the vivid, internally generated reality of the dream 
with the awareness that it is a dream (Hearne, 1978; LaBerge, 1980b).  Mainstream interest in 
lucid dreaming is a relatively recent development, with depictions and discussions of the topic 
now appearing in cinema, news media, and on countless websites.   
The growing interest in lucid dreaming may lie in the potential it holds for individuals who 
can become adept at it to utilize their own private, sensory-realistic environment that is not 
subject to societal or physical limitations.  While a discussion of Freud’s Interpretation of 
Dreams (1955) is unnecessary here, it should not be overlooked that lucid dreaming likely 
appeals to many because it appears to offer the promise of wish fulfillment.  Nonetheless, it is 
when the potential applications of lucid dreaming in clinical and research settings are 
considered that it becomes clear why this phenomenon is worthy of further investigation.   
For instance, lucid dream training has been shown to be an effective treatment for 
recurrent nightmares (Zadra and Pihl 1997), which are often a symptom of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (APA, 2000).  Lucid dreaming may have still more, yet unrealized, applications to 
psychotherapy.  A novel approach to the treatment of anxiety and phobic disorders, for 
example, might utilize the realistic yet protected context of a lucid dream for exposure-based 
therapies.  Lucid dreams could also aid in the alleviation of persistent negative mood symptoms 
in the bereaved, serving as a place for such clients to address unresolved issues with the 
deceased through simulated dream interactions not possible in waking.  In research contexts, 
lucid dreamers have been able to communicate to outside observers from within their dreams to 
provide insights into the nature of dreaming and of consciousness itself.   
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Yet, in spite of evidence that lucid dreaming is a learnable skill (Laberge, 1980c), that 
there are now a wide variety of lucid dream induction methods available (Clerc, 1983; The 
Lucidity Institute, 2009; LaBerge & Dement, 1982a; Levitan, 1992; Paulsson & Parker, 2006; 
Price & Cohen, 1988; Price et al., 1991) and the enticing appeal for personal, clinical, and 
research applications, there is no evidence to suggest that lucid dreaming is any more prevalent 
now than it has been at any time in the past.  While the potential uses for lucid dreaming in 
clinical or research work will hopefully be the topic of future investigations, at present, many 
basic questions about lucid dreaming still need to be addressed.  Broadly, this study aims to 
address the question of whether, and to what extent, lucidity in dreams is related to 
psychological and neuropsychological functions in waking.   
Whereas non-lucid dreams have traditionally been deemed ‘cognitively deficient’ 
compared with waking (Rechtschaffen, 1978), lucid dreams are often accompanied by a 
capacity for levels of cognitive and metacognitive functioning typically observed only during 
periods of wakefulness (Kahan & Laberge, 1994a).  This can include the ability to reason 
clearly, control attention, maintain self- and state-reflective awareness, and act in a thoughtful 
and volitional manner (LaBerge, 1985a).  But while anecdotal accounts suggest lucid dreams 
are associated with higher levels of attentional, executive, and metacognitive functioning, the 
particular constellation of cognitive functions associated with lucid dreaming has not been well 
characterized.   
As has been suggested by several researchers, the state of lucid dreaming has certain 
unmistakable similarities to waking meditative and mindful states (Hunt, 1989; Hunt & Ogilvie, 
1989; Stumbrys, 2011).  Several studies have demonstrated that mindfulness meditation is 
associated with improvements in attentional, executive, and metacognitive functioning 
(Grossman, Niemann et al. 2004; Lazar, Kerr et al. 2005; Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz et al. 2007; 
Ivanovski 2007; Moore and Malinowski 2009; Vestergaard-Poulsen, van Beek et al. 2009).  
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While it would be premature to claim that such functions are “required” for lucid dreaming, it 
does appear that the cognitive profile that is typically associated with mindfulness-based 
practices is at least shared with those proposed to be associated with lucid dreaming. 
According to the continuity theory of dreaming, the brain-mind processes underlying the 
phenomenological experiences in waking and dreaming are shared.  To date, this theory has 
been tested primarily with respect to the thematic contents of waking and dreaming (For a 
review, see Domhoff, 1996).  With a few exceptions (Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & LaBerge, 
2011; LaBerge et al., 1995), continuity theory has not been tested with regard to the similarities 
and differences between cognitive processes in waking and dreaming.  It is still unclear, for 
example, whether an individual’s profile of cognitive strengths and weaknesses translate from 
their waking state into their dreams. 
The ensuing review provides the theoretical framework and empirical basis for this 
study’s overarching hypothesis that certain psychological and neuropsychological functions are, 
in fact, continuous across waking and dreaming and are associated with the ability of the 
dreamer to be aware that he or she is dreaming.  The review will begin with the historical origins 
of the scientific investigations of mindfulness and lucid dreaming.  Following this, the 
physiological characteristics of sleep will be discussed in order to provide the background for a 
description of the prevailing neuropsychological model of dreaming and a discussion of an 
important debate over the validity of this model.  A comprehensive review of lucid dream 
research will then be presented, including studies which have investigated the physiological, 
personality, and cognitive factors associated with lucid dreams.  Included in this section will be 
an overview of lucid dream induction methods, which should also provide some insight into the 
cognitive profile of lucid dreaming.  In the final sections, the main theoretical bases of the 
present study will be presented.  This will include a more detailed discussion of the continuity 
theory of dreams, particularly as it applies to cognitive processes, and a review of two 
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constructs which are presumed to be integrally related to lucid dreams – dream self-
reflectiveness and dream mindfulness.  The review concludes with a summary and study 
overview, including detailed specific aims and hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Historical Background 
In the course of characterizing and describing many of his own personal dream 
experiences, Dutch Psychiatrist and author, Frederik van Eeden (Van Eeden, 1913) was the 
first to use the term “lucid dream” in scientific publication.  He wrote: “Now this is simply a 
question of nomenclature. I can only say that I made my observations during normal deep and 
healthy sleep, and that in 352 cases I had a full recollection of my day-life, and could act 
voluntarily, though I was so fast asleep that no bodily sensations penetrated into my perception. 
If anybody refuses to call that state of mind a dream, he may suggest some other name. For my 
part, it was just this form of dream, which I call ‘lucid dreams,’ which aroused my keenest 
interest and which I noted down most carefully.” 
By the mid 1950’s, within the realm of psychology and psychiatry, much attention was 
being paid to the meaning of dream content - particularly with regard to waking psychology 
(Freud, 1955).  Little attention was paid, however, to the level of awareness or the cognitive 
capacities of dreamer within the dream.  The discovery of REM sleep by Eugene Aserinsky and 
Nathanial Kleitman in 1953 ushered in an era of dream science in which the physiology of REM 
sleep was believed to underlie the phenomenological experience of dreaming.  However, while 
this era yielded important discoveries which furthered our understanding of REM physiology and 
the nature of dream content, it ultimately became apparent that there were several, significant 
problems with the assumption that REM sleep is either necessary or sufficient for dreaming (For 
a review, see Foulkes, 1996).  Later, direct evidence that REM sleep could occur without 
dreaming and that dreaming could occur in the absence of REM sleep (Borbely & Wittmann, 
2000; Solms, 2000a) would lead to a long and heated debate over the physiological basis of 
dreaming.   
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With the only objective method for specifying and quantifying the brain activity 
associated with dreaming proving to be unreliable, the scientific study of dreams was faced with 
a significant methodological problem.1  By 1978, a potential solution to this problem was already 
available.  The first laboratory studies of lucid dreaming by Hearne (1978) and later by LaBerge 
(1980) demonstrated that objectively verifiable physiological data could be obtained from 
dreams in real time.  In these early studies, lucid dreamers used a previously agreed upon 
series of eye movements to signal to researchers that they had realized they were dreaming. 2  
Lucid dreamers could also communicate about other features of the dream using these eye 
movement patterns.   
Yet, despite its promise to bring some objectivity back into the field of dream research, 
the use of lucid dreaming as a research paradigm was slow to catch on.  This was likely due to 
several limiting factors – one of which was the infrequency with which lucid dreams occur in the 
general population and the rarity of proficient lucid dreamers.  Estimates of the prevalence of 
lucid dreaming in the general population have suggested that while approximately 58% of 
people have experienced a lucid dream at least once in their lifetime (Gackenbach, 1984), only 
about 21% experience lucid dreaming more than once per month (Gackenbach, 1984; LaBerge, 
1985a) and just 2% are able to willfully induce lucid dreams (Gackenbach, 1984).   
Another early and oddly persistent criticism of the lucid dream paradigm was the belief 
that lucid dreams could not even exist given what was known about REM sleep physiology.  
                                                             
1 David Foulkes’ poignantly titled review, Dream Research, 1953 – 1996, chronicled the rise and fall of 
dream study since the discovery of REM sleep, and posited several explanations for the decline and near 
disappearance of dream laboratories (Foulkes, 1996).  In his review, Foulkes attributed the ebb in 
research primarily to the finding that REM sleep and dreaming were not interchangeable. 
2 The approach they used to demonstrate the authenticity of lucid dreaming should be at least partly 
credited to Celia Green (Green, 1968).  Green suggested that while most efferent motor activity is 
greatly attenuated during REM sleep, oculo-motor activity is its hallmark, and thus, eye movements 
could be used as an observable signal if the dreamer could voluntarily produce a predetermined pattern 
one they had realized they were dreaming (Green, 1968).  The first measurable communications from a 
dream were sent in this way by Alan Worsley and subsequently by LaBerge in the late 1970’s. 
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That is, prevailing models of the neurobiology of dreaming from 1953 until the late-1990’s/early 
2000’s held that, during REM sleep when most dreams were believed to occur, the 
neurobiological state of the brain was not capable of such higher-level cognitive (and certainly 
not of metacognitive) functions.  Admittedly, it is reasonable to speculate that the delayed 
uptake of a lucid dream research paradigm by the sleep research field can be attributed in part 
to the lack of a model which could account for it.  Nonetheless, research had demonstrated that 
lucid dreaming emerged from within the context of otherwise ‘normative’ REM sleep processes 
(LaBerge, Levitan, et al., 1983) and any model of dream neurobiology needs to account for this. 
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in lucid dreaming, with studies 
employing ever-more sophisticated methods to better characterize the neurophysiological 
correlates of lucidity.  These include investigations using EEG power spectra (Holzinger et al., 
2006; Voss et al., 2009) and, more recently, a breakthrough study which employed a 
simultaneous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and polysomnography (Dresler et 
al., 2011) approach to record blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activation associated with 
motor activity during a signal verified lucid dream.  This aforementioned study is likely just a 
preview of what is to come in lucid dream research.   
As more of these sorts of studies are conducted, the reliance on content studies will 
likely diminish.  Until such time, the exploration of dreams through subjective reports is still 
warranted and, ultimately, will help to guide future investigations employing more objective 
measures.  Throughout the next several sections, a more thorough review of the scientific 
literature which has led to robust models of sleep physiology and dream phenomenology will be 
presented.  This review is intended to provide the basis for one of this study’s central 
assumptions – that dreams can support levels of cognitive functions similar to waking. 
Sleep Physiology and Phenomenology 
Since the introduction of Rechtschaffen and Kales’ (Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968) 
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standardized scoring criteria, sleep has traditionally been categorized into five stages based on 
characteristic polysomnographic (EEG, EOG, EMG) features.  However, when the five-stage 
model was developed, the understanding of the processes and functions of each stage were 
just beginning to be understood.  More recently, it has become common to see sleep studies 
which refer simply to non-rapid eye movement (NREM) and rapid eye movement (REM) states.  
NREM sleep can refer to stages one through four, which generally involve an increasing depth 
of sleep, culminating in slow wave sleep.  REM sleep stands apart from these stages, both in 
terms of its electrophysiological characteristics and in its particularly strong association with 
vivid dreaming. 
Non-REM Sleep 
In terms of electrophysiology, stage-one sleep contains vertex sharp-waves and 
increased alpha frequency band (8 – 12 Hz) activity compared with waking.  Individuals 
awakened from this stage report a general feeling of drowsiness and “drifting off” to sleep 
accompanied in some cases by hallucinatory sensations.  Stage-two sleep is characterized by a 
decrease in the alpha activity seen during sleep onset/stage one sleep and the emergence of K-
complex wave forms and spindle activity (12 – 14 Hz) in the EEG.  Both K-complexes and 
spindles have been shown to accompany brief periods of arousal (i.e. near or full awakening), 
typically in response to some exogenous stimulation (De Gennaro, 2003; Yamadori, 1971).  
Mentation is sometimes reported from stage-two awakenings, but is often less bizarre than the 
hypnogogic imagery of stage one or REM-sleep dreams (Nielsen, 2000c).  Stage-three sleep is 
marked by the increasingly frequent appearance of delta waves (0.5 – 4 Hz) in the EEG while 
stage-four is defined as the presence of delta waves in at least 50% of the sleep EEG 
(Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968).  Stages three and four are often collectively referred to as ‘slow 
wave sleep’ (SWS) or ‘delta sleep’ since the distinction between them appears to be somewhat 
arbitrary.  During SWS, patterns of neural activation appear to oscillate between thalamic and 
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cortical networks.  This oscillation is associated with the slow, periodic delta wave forms 
(Steriade et al., 1993) that can be observed in the EEG during these stages.  This activity is 
believed to be generated by the intrinsic oscillating properties of certain thalamic neurons or by 
cortical input to inhibitory thalamic interneurons (Muzur, 2005; Steriade, 2000).  Generally, 
awakenings from SWS yield subjective reports of phenomena that are typically easily 
distinguishable from reports from other stages due to their general lack of visual imagery and 
thought-like nature (Bosinelli & Cicogna, 2000; Hobson et al., 1998; Kahan, 2000; Purcell et al., 
1986; Solms, 2000a). 
REM Sleep 
As alluded to above, REM sleep follows SWS in the normal temporal progression of a 
nighttime sleep period.  The alternation of REM and NREM stages during sleep follows an 
ultradian (> once per day) rhythmicity of approximately 90 minutes.  This alternation is thought 
by some to result from an interplay between inhibitory aminergic and excitatory cholinergic 
neurons of the mesopontine tegmentum responding to the homeostatic and circadian inputs 
from other parts of the CNS (Hobson & McCarley, 1977).  REM sleep periods tend to be 
lengthier and more frequent toward the end of the sleep period due to the particular nature of 
the interaction of homeostatic and circadian processes (Achermann, 2004; Borbely, 1982a, 
1982b; Diederich, 2007; Maquet, 1999; Maquet & Phillips, 1998) which put the brain in a more 
aroused state during the early morning hours.   
Electrophysiologically, REM sleep is a state of low-amplitude, mixed-frequency activity 
that on superficial inspection appears similar to waking, leading some researchers to refer to 
this state as “paradoxical sleep”.  Within REM sleep however, there are further distinctions 
which may be made with regard to patterns of electrophysiological characteristics.  The more 
physiologically active portion is referred to as phasic REM sleep, as it involves phasic bursts of 
muscle activity and rapid ocular saccades. The less active period, known as tonic REM, 
Mindfulness and Dreaming 19 
 
generally involves little to no phasic muscle or oculomotor activity (Diederich, 2007; 
Rechtschaffen & Kales, 1968).   
The unique pattern of REM sleep electrophysiology emerges from an increase in the 
firing rates of a distributed network of neurons across subcortical, reticular, thalamocortical and 
cortical levels.  Activation in forebrain regions during REM sleep arises from the ascending 
arousal systems, including areas of the pontine brainstem, midbrain reticular activating system, 
hypothalamus, and basal forebrain.  Phasic REM sleep potentials occur sequentially, originating 
in the pons and propagating along projections to the thalamic lateral geniculate body before 
terminating in the occipital cortex – representing the characteristic pontine-geniculate-occipital 
(PGO) waves seen in the REM sleep EEG.  PGO waves likely account for visual phenomena of 
dreams.  At the neuronal level, this pattern of activation is thought to be the result of 
simultaneous tonic disinhibition and phasic excitation of burst cells in the lateral 
pontomesencephalic tegmentum (Gottesmann, 2002a, 2002b, 2006, 2008).  The pontine 
aminergic system is active in waking and inhibits the pontine cholinergic system, which is 
believed by some (see ‘REM=dreaming debate’ below for alternative views) to be responsible 
for initiating REM sleep (Hobson & McCarley, 1977).  In this view, during NREM sleep aminergic 
inhibition begins to subside and cholinergic excitation increases until REM sleep onset, where 
aminergic inhibition of REM terminates and cholinergic excitability reaches its peak.   
As a consequence of this proposed model of REM sleep neurobiology, there is a 
relatively high degree of arousal in REM sleep which is thought to be reflected in the increased 
vividness of dream imagery and “feeling of reality” relative to dreams of other stages.  This 
explanation is also used to account for observations that there is a greater likelihood of 
awakening from REM sleep. Finally, a heightened state of arousal during REM sleep has been 
cited as a potential explanation for why lucid dreams tend to occur most frequently during REM 
periods, particularly during the early morning hours, when this state of arousal is typically at its 
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peak prior to awakening (LaBerge, 1985b). 
Maquet and colleagues have provided some validation for the model just described 
using a neuroimaging approach.  Using positron emission tomography, they have demonstrated 
that regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) is, in fact, positively correlated with REM sleep in the 
pontine tegmentum.  They also found relative increases in rCBF in the left thalamus, bilateral 
amygdaloid complexes, anterior cingulate cortex and right parietal operculum.  Relative 
decreases in rCBF were demonstrated bilaterally in a vast area of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC), in the supramarginal gyrus of the parietal cortex and the precuneus during REM 
sleep.  The authors note that the pattern of activation between the amygdala and cortical areas 
provides a biological basis for certain types of emotional memory processing during REM sleep 
(Maquet & Phillips, 1998).   
Section Summary 
To conclude this section on sleep physiology, empirical evidence from decades of 
research has largely supported the idea that REM sleep is the state most closely associated 
with dreaming.  That said, this body of research has also demonstrated that dreams can occur 
during other stages of sleep as well (Bosinelli & Cicogna, 2000; Khambalia & Shapiro, 2000; 
Solms, 2000a).  This has led to an important debate over the dissociability of REM sleep 
neurological processes and dream phenomenology.  In the next section, one of the most 
popularized theories of dream neuropsychology developed by Alan Hobson and colleagues will 
first be reviewed.  Following this review a broad overview of the debate over whether REM 
sleep=dreaming will be presented.  The aim of these reviews will be to provide the necessary 
background and point of contrast for the later discussion of lucid dreaming and its physiological 
and phenomenological correlates. 
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Dream Neuropsychology 
Hobson and colleagues’ models of dreaming represent some of the most thorough 
attempts to map the ‘formal features’ of dreaming onto the underlying brain state of REM sleep.  
That is, these models have all sought to describe the gamut of characteristic phenomenological 
features of dreams as a function of the neurophysiology of REM sleep.  This has largely been 
done by applying knowledge from neuropsychological studies, that is, of the phenomenological 
correlates of neurophysiological processes in waking, to explaining REM sleep dreams.  The 
model described below is the most recent iteration of an ongoing attempt by Hobson and others 
to explain dream content by REM sleep neurobiology.  Previously, the reciprocal interaction 
(Hobson et al., 1975; McCarley & Hobson, 1975) and activation synthesis (Hobson & McCarley, 
1977) models, the current version, referred to as the Activation-Input Source -Modulation (AIM) 
model (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002; Hobson et al., 2003) is an attempt to fit the patterns of 
neural activity in REM sleep into a three dimensional state-space model with each dimension 
representing a different aspect of a brain-mind system.  REM sleep falls at one extreme of the 
activation (A) axis (i.e. REM sleep involves a high level of activation compared with other states 
of consciousness), at the extreme endogeneous end of the input source (I) dimension and at the 
extreme cholinergic end of the modulation (M) axis (i.e. REM sleep neural activity is purported 
to be primarily cholinergically modulated) (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002).   
As mentioned, the corresponding neuropsychological model of dreaming focuses on 
explaining the ‘formal features’ of dreaming: dream hallucinations, bizarreness and loosely 
themed narratives, a delusional belief in the reality of the dream and a lack of self-reflection, 
content instability, high emotionality, predominance of instinctual programs, lack of volition, and 
poor memory both within the dream and when attempting to recall the dream upon awakening.  
It is presumed then that each of these phenomenological features is relatively consistent across 
all dreams and the result of the particular nature of REM sleep as defined in the AIM model. 
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According to the specific details of the model, activation of the basal ganglia likely 
initiates the false sense of movement in the dream, which continues to work in concert with the 
cerebellum to fine tune this fictive movement while activation in the inferior parietal cortex allows 
for the spatial orientation of the dream body within the internally generated dream space.  With 
noradrenergic projections to the spinal cord inhibited during REM sleep, activity in the basal 
ganglia, cerebellum, and parietal areas gives rise to dreamed corporeal movement without 
affecting PNS output (Aston-Jones, 1981).  Dream hallucinations may occur in all perceptual 
and motor modalities during dreams.  As pontine-geniculo-occipital activity is turned on in REM 
sleep, projections from visual areas of the occipital lobes are sent to the lateral geniculate 
nucleus and other thalamic nuclei involved in relaying sensory information to be interpreted by 
higher order visual association areas, generating dreamed visual imagery.  The result is the 
internally formulated sensorimotor phenomena of dreaming which, in the absence of 
exogeneous feedback is shaped instead by these association areas, lending dreams a 
characteristic hyper-associative quality (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 2002).   
Activation in the amygdala, anterior cingulate, parahippocampal cortex, hippocampus, 
and medial frontal regions during REM sleep are thought to underlie the emotionally-laden 
content of dreams which appears to draw on seemingly random memories which are then 
integrated into what becomes a loosely themed narrative based on autobiographical history.  
Hobson suggests that the decrease in activation in areas of the medial orbitofrontal cortex and 
insula during REM sleep may account for a confabulatory, normally unquestioned acceptance of 
the dream as “real” in spite of its bizarre, disjointed nature (Braun, 1997; Nofzinger, 1997).  
Deactivation of dorsolateral prefrontal areas in REM sleep likely contributes to this loss of logical 
reasoning as well as impaired volition and working memory in dreams (Hobson & Pace-Schott, 
2002).   
Though this particular model appears to be comprehensive and sufficiently and logically 
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ties each of the proposed ‘formal features’ of dreaming to underlying REM sleep processes, 
there are at least two features of dreaming which remain unaccounted for.  While the authors 
explain that dreams typically involve impaired retrospective memory functions, there also 
appears to be impairment of prospective memory functions as well.  That is, in dreams we often 
forget the intentions we have set forth during prior periods of waking and even from earlier 
within the same dream.  Though this has not been demonstrated conclusively in any empirical 
study, the failure of prospective memory functions during REM sleep would be consistent with 
the neurobiology of REM sleep.  It has been shown in PET and fMRI studies that there is a 
decrease in activity in the precuneus during REM sleep relative to wakefulness (Hobson et al., 
1998; Maquet, 2000; Maquet, Peters, Aerts, Delifiore, et al., 1996; Maquet & Phillips, 1998; 
Maquet et al., 2005).  Functional studies of the precuneus during waking suggests that it is 
involved in prospective remembering as the failure to recall intentions is associated with 
decreased activation in the precuneus compared with successful recall (Burgess et al., 2001; 
den Ouden, 2005).  An additional feature that is poorly explained by Hobson and colleagues’ 
model is perceptual and behavioral occurrences that are unique to dreaming, such as abnormal 
visual perceptual experiences and flying.  Imaging studies of REM sleep have shown decreased 
activity in the supramarginal gyrus (Maquet, 1999; Maquet, Peters, Aerts, Delifiore, et al., 1996; 
Maquet & Phillips, 1998; Maquet et al., 2005) – an area believed to be involved in a number of 
functions including bodily representation and visual-spatial orientation (Darling, 2003).  This 
relative deactivation may explain why dreams often involve anomalies in bodily representation 
and orientation.   
Hobson and colleagues’ AIM model provides an empirically supported foundation which 
begins to explain the variations in cognitive functions across the wake-sleep continuum.  
Though this model offers much in the way of correlating neurobiology with dream 
phenomenology, it has also received some warranted criticism.  Aside from being slightly 
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incomplete, there has been an important debate over some of this model’s more basic 
assumptions – foremost being the assumptions that dream narratives are driven by activation of 
subcortical limbic areas and that cholinergically modulated, pontine activation is necessarily 
associated with dreaming. Conflicting evidence has emerged from lesion and dream content 
studies which contradicts these points (Nielsen, 2004; Nielsen, 2000a; Nielsen, 2000b, 2000c; 
Solms, 2000a, 2000b; Solms, 1995, 2000c). 
REM sleep and Dreaming 
As alluded to above, Solms provided some of the first clear evidence in support of a 
different model of dream generation (Solms, 2000a, 2000b; Solms, 1995, 2000c).  In this 
alternative model, the pontine brain stem is not the generator of dreaming but instead, temporal-
limbic and forebrain structures.  Solms also rejected the idea that dreams are simply the brain’s 
attempt to wrap a narrative around the otherwise random firing of neuronal networks originating 
in the brain stem.  While he shares Hobson’s view that the pons may trigger the initiation of 
REM sleep, he contends that the there is a separate trigger for initiating the neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying dreaming – mechanisms which lie in dispersed dopaminergic temporal-
limbic regions.  Connections between frontal and limbic regions are proposed by Solms to 
subserve a selection process for the activation arising from temporal-limbic areas.   
In fact it had already been shown in several studies (Foulkes, 1962; Monroe et al., 1965) 
that about one quarter of all dreams which might be considered ‘REM like’ actually occur in 
NREM sleep (Solms, 2000a).  Nielsen’s review of research in this area suggested that about 
50% dream mentation recall comes from NREM sleep (Nielsen, 2000c).  Together, these 
findings cast serious doubt on any model which relates dreaming solely to the brain-stem 
processes of overt REM sleep, such as Hobson and colleague’s neuropsychological model of 
dreaming (Hobson et al., 1998).  On the other hand, some have suggested that there may be a 
‘covert’ REM sleep which could potentially resolve the two models (Bosinelli & Cicogna, 2000; 
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Cavallero, 2000; Nielsen, 2000b, 2000c; Ogilvie et al., 2000; Pace-Schott, 2000). 
NREM dreams occur in a state which bears very little electrophysiological resemblance 
to REM, suggesting of course that these dreams are generated by brain states other than REM 
sleep (Solms, 2000a).  Nielsen suggested that “covert REM” processes may be present during 
NREM sleep stages and may be responsible for the generation NREM dreams (Nielsen, 2000c).  
Covert REM, Nielsen suggests, would be similar to a stage of sleep known as SP, which has 
been well documented in cats.  SP amounts to SWS accompanied by the pontine-geniculate-
occipital waves typically associated with REM sleep.  As mentioned previously, these 
waveforms are thought to be related to dream imagery.  If this process is truly occurring during 
human stage 2 sleep or even SWS, it seems possible that the dream reports elicited here might 
be difficult to distinguish from REM sleep dreams. 
Whether a human analogue to SP exists has not been definitively established, but 
Solms’ clinical studies provided evidence that individuals with pontine brainstem lesions retain 
the ability to dream (Solms, 2000a).  In a series of studies, he identified two brain areas which 
might be associated with dream generation, including the prefrontal cortex and an area at the 
parietal-temporal-occipital (PTO) junction.  In a striking refutation of one of the core assumptions 
of the REM = dreaming hypotheses, damage to these areas completely obliterated dreaming in 
his patients while leaving REM sleep intact.  Thus, even attempting to explain NREM dreams by 
arguing for a ‘covert REM’ state, still fails to explain the dreams of patients with pontine lesions.  
In other words, it appears likely that dreaming originates from areas other than the pontine 
brainstem.   
Based on a review of studies from lesioned patients, Solms claimed that: 
“Dreaming is not an intrinsic function of REM sleep (or the brain stem mechanisms that 
control it). Rather, dreaming appears to be a consequence of various forms of cerebral 
activation during sleep.  This implies a two-stage process, involving (1) cerebral activation 
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during sleep and (2) dreaming. The first stage can take various forms, none of which is specific 
to dreaming itself, since reliable dissociations can be demonstrated between dreaming and all of 
these states (including REM).  The second stage (dreaming itself) occurs only if and when the 
initial activation stage engages the dopaminergic circuits of the ventromedial forebrain. It is 
reasonable to hypothesize on this basis that these forebrain circuits are the final common path 
leading from various forms of cerebral activation during sleep (both REM and NREM) to 
dreaming per se.”  (Solms, 2000a, p. 849, p. 849)  
In addition to questioning the prevailing hypothesized mechanism for dream production, 
some researchers such as LaBerge, have taken issue with the AIM’s initial oversimplification of 
the variety of dream experience and even its misspecification of the features of normal REM 
dreams within their state-space model.  For instance, even while dreams are typically 
associated with impaired cognitive functioning, REM sleep is not associated with a low “A” value 
relative to waking.  One of the assumptions of AIM is that information flow (I) is uniform across 
sensory modalities within a given state (i.e. waking, dreaming).  LaBerge noted however that “it 
is possible for one sense to remain awake, while others fall asleep” (LaBerge, 1990b, 2000) and 
many are aware of the phenomenon of stimuli from the waking world becoming incorporated 
into dream content.   In order to capture the fact that any of the features of dreams may also be 
present to varying degrees in other states of consciousness such as waking and NREM sleep, 
the current neuropsychological model might best be broadened to explain the full variety of 
dreamed experience, including lucid dreaming. 
Spurned by the apparent inadequacy of Hobson’s neuropsychological model, Domhoff 
published a ‘new’ neurocognitive theory of dreaming, built on the above findings as well as 
studies of dream content in children and adults (Domhoff, 2001).  He proposed that the 
forebrain network, believed by Solms and others to be involved in dream generation, develops 
gradually over the first 8 to 9 years of life and that this development is reflected in the changing 
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content of dreams from childhood into early adolescence.  Specifically, he cites the finding that 
before age 9, only 20-30% of REM period awakenings lead to dream reports and that the dream 
content of children under age 5 is comparatively ‘bland and static’ by comparison.  Domhoff 
further cites content studies which have suggested an interaction between the continuity and 
repetition principles, discussed in greater detail below (see Continuity Theory), which suggests 
that thinking during dreaming is largely figurative.  To sum up his proposed theory, he states 
that: 1) Dreaming depends on a neural network involving limbic, paralimbic, and associational 
areas of the forebrain; 2)  Dreaming is develops gradually over the first 8 or 9 years of life and; 
3) Dream content is largely continuous with waking (Domhoff, 2001).  Recently, Domhoff has 
expanded his neurocognitive theory of dreaming by proposing that it may be a subsystem of the 
‘default mode’ or resting state network (Domhoff, 2011).  This is an intriguing hypothesis that 
has been proposed by other dream researchers as well (Ioannides et al., 2009; Nir & Tononi, 
2010; Pace-Schott, 2007) and which has implications for the theoretical basis of the present 
study.  However, a discussion of these implications is more appropriately placed within the 
context of a later review of the continuity theory of dreams (see p. 37).   
Section Summary 
The prevailing model of REM sleep dreaming as proposed by Hobson and colleagues 
provides some guidance in understanding how the brain may produce the unique experiential 
qualities of dreaming in that it outlines the particular brain areas which may be involved and the 
nature of activation in those areas during normative REM sleep.  Research in the past decade 
however has called some of this model’s basic assumptions into question.  Most importantly 
lesion studies which have shown REM sleep can occur in the absence of dreaming and that 
dreaming can occur in the absence of overt REM sleep, suggest that the mechanism of dream 
generation may not lie within the pontine brainstem but instead in regions of the forebrain.  
Nonetheless, the pattern of neurophysiological activation associated with REM sleep is most 
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often associated with dreaming and the possibility of covert REM processes during NREM sleep 
suggests that Hobson and colleagues’ model remains a useful starting point for understanding 
why dreams take the forms and contain the types of content that they do.   
As will be discussed below, lucid dreaming has been found to occur almost exclusively 
during REM sleep.  Hobson and colleagues’ neuropsychological model of REM sleep dreaming 
can thus serve as a starting point for understanding how lucid dreaming can emerge from the 
underlying brain state of REM sleep.  The next section will review the research literature 
describing the physiological features of lucid dreams as well as the personality factors and 
cognitive characteristics most often associated with lucid dreaming.  A review of various lucid 
dream induction methods will also be presented as they may also provide some insight into the 
brain bases for this state.  The aim of these reviews is to provide the main rationale behind this 
study’s primary hypothesis – that mindfulness in waking is related to lucidity in dreams. 
Lucid Dreaming  
Physiology 
To investigate the neurophysiology of lucid dreaming, it is typically necessary to have, at 
minimum, the capability of recording physiological markers that can verify sleep and at least one 
participant with the capability of both inducing a lucid dream during recording and signaling to 
external observers that he or she has become lucid.  Such signal verified lucid dreams (SVLD’s) 
are rare, even in the most well controlled studies with some of the most adept lucid dreamers.  
As a result, much remains unknown about the physiological processes involved in lucid 
dreaming.  Given that a more widespread interest in lucid dreaming is a relatively recent 
development and also due to the methodological difficulties in studying lucid dreams in the 
laboratory, there have been comparatively few studies in this area relative to sleep physiology 
more generally. 
Nonetheless, several studies have provided some evidence which has furthered our 
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understanding of the physiology of lucid dreaming.  By employing the SVLD paradigm, it has 
been demonstrated that lucid dreams (at least SVLD’s, that is) most frequently occur during 
phasic REM sleep (LaBerge et al., 1986).  SVLD’s also seem to involve essentially the same 
patterning of electrophysiological activation as waking experiences with respect to certain 
behaviors carried out while the dreamer is lucid.   For instance, it appears that the right-left 
hemispheric lateralization observed during waking for activities like singing (greater right 
hemisphere activity) and counting (greater left hemispheric activity) also holds true for lucid 
dreaming (LaBerge & Dement, 1982b).  The patterns of electrophysiological activation 
associated with sexual activity are also similar during both lucid dreaming and waking (LaBerge, 
Greenleaf, et al., 1983). 
Schatzman, Fenwick, and Worsley (1988) used the SVLD method to investigate whether 
pre-planned actions, carried out in lucid dreams, produced corresponding changes in 
electrophysiological measures.  These activities included kicking dream objects, writing with 
umbrellas, drawing triangles and snapping fingers.  Results confirmed that the muscles of the 
body show small movements corresponding to the body's actions in the dream.  Furthermore, it 
has been demonstrated that the eyes do track dream objects as lucid dreamers have been able 
to produce slow ocular saccades which are very difficult to produce in the absence of a "real" 
stimulus (Fenwick et al., 1984; LaBerge & Zimbardo, 2000; Schatzman, 1988).  Eye movement 
density has also been positively correlated with lucid dream probability (LaBerge et al., 1986).   
Comparisons of eye movement density, heart rate, respiratory rate, and skin potentials 
between epochs of lucid and non-lucid REM have demonstrated greater levels of autonomic 
activation overall in the thirty seconds preceding and following lucidity onset (LaBerge, Levitan, 
et al., 1983).  Specifically, skin potentials are higher and eye movements more frequent in the 
thirty seconds preceding SVLDS relative to non-lucid REM periods.   
One interesting though inconsistent finding is that alpha frequency band power has been 
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associated with ‘pre-lucid’ dreams (Ogilvie, 1982a; Tyson, 1984).  In a “pre-lucid” state, the 
dreamer suspects he/she may be in a dream but has not made a distinct determination 
(LaBerge, 1980a; Ogilvie, 1982a; Tyson, 1984).  H-reflex suppression, a characteristic of non-
lucid REM sleep, has been shown to be even greater during SVLD’s (LaBerge, 1990b).  The 
direction of eye movements and rate of respiration in lucid dreams have been shown to be 
under voluntary control and correlate with the objective physiological measures of these 
variables taken during lucid dreams (LaBerge & Dement, 1982a, 1982b). 
One study demonstrated increased activity in the beta-1 frequency band (13 – 19 Hz) in 
the parietal region during lucid as opposed to non-lucid REM periods (Holzinger et al., 2006), 
particularly over the left parietal lobe.  This region of the brain is purported by the authors to be 
associated with semantic understanding and self-awareness.  The authors suggest that this 
activity reflects the ability of the lucid dreamer to understand the meaning of the “I am dreaming” 
statement. 
A recent study by Dresler (Dresler et al., 2011) revealed that the performance of a hand-
clench motor task produced similar patterns of activation across actual waking performance, 
imagined performance, and dreamed performance.  They used the SVLD approach along with 
simultaneous recording of polysomnography and fMRI to compare the degree and extent of 
activation across these three states.  Waking demonstrated the strongest activation, followed by 
dreaming, then imagined hand clenching.  
These studies suggest that lucid dreams emerge from a particularly active and aroused 
neurophysiological state, but that this state is essentially REM sleep.  While it is plausible to 
assume that areas of the prefrontal cortex, associated with metacognitive functioning in waking, 
are also involved in lucid dreaming, very few studies provide support for this hypothesis.  One of 
the few studies which does provide such support had methodological problems which reduce 
confidence in their results (Voss et al., 2009).  Specifically, their finding that lucidity was 
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associated with greater theta band activity in the region of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was 
confounded by potential eye-movement artifact. 
While the neurophysiological correlates of meditation will be addressed later, it should 
also be pointed out here that increased alpha power, of the kind seen in ‘pre-lucid’ states has 
been associated with mindfulness meditation as well (Chiesa, 2009; Ivanovski & Malhi, 2007).  
This would appear to support the idea that mindfulness and lucidity are related.  However, the 
increased alpha activity often seen in frontal and parietal regions with mindfulness meditation is 
also an inconsistent finding and increased beta and theta frequency band power has also been 
associated with mindfulness meditation (Ivanovski & Malhi, 2007).  The implication of these 
findings is, therefore, still unclear.  It is entirely possible that there is no meaningful relationship 
between the alpha activity observed during pre-lucidity and the fact that mindfulness meditation 
may be associated with increases in alpha.  Nonetheless, one potential explanation for these 
prior findings is that the neurophysiological deactivation that is typically associated with 
increases in alpha power is reflective of greater efficiency of processing in meditators.  In 
dreams, this could mean a decreased demand for resources that might well allow for the 
additional, metacognitive capacity that would aid in lucidity onset.  Alternatively, as high levels of 
alpha have also been associated with higher levels of dream bizarreness (Ogilvie, 1982b), it 
may simply be that the dreamer is more likely to notice that some aspect of his or her 
experience is ‘dream like’, thus triggering a more critical state of awareness that could lead to 
the onset of a lucid dream. 
Examining patterns of neural activation associated with lucid dreaming using EEG is 
clearly difficult and potentially misleading.  While a functional neuroimaging approach will likely 
help to clarify the neurophysiological correlates of lucid dreaming, it is still important that such 
investigations be guided by an empirically derived neuropsychological model of lucid dreaming 
as has been proposed by others (e.g. Domhoff, 2011).  Such a model will aid in making 
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predictions about the type of activation one might expect during a lucid dream given, for 
instance, how lucid dreamers differ from non-lucid dreamers in terms of their waking personality 
characteristics and cognitive functioning.   
Personality 
Fortunately, compared with the number of studies investigating lucid dream physiology, 
there is already a relative abundance of studies which have investigated the personality 
characteristics of lucid dreamers.  Unfortunately, it has been difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions about the relationships between lucid dreaming and any demographic, sleep, or 
personality variables.  Few studies have reliably identified any single variable or set of variables 
which can reliably predict lucid dreaming ability.  One potential reason for this is that individuals 
in these studies are often arbitrarily grouped into different frequencies of lucid dream occurrence 
(i.e. high, medium or low) and there is rarely appreciation for the varying degrees or types of 
lucidity (i.e. non-lucid, pre-lucid, lucid, lucid control).  In spite of these limitations, this body of 
research has contributed some important findings and, however inconsistent, lucid dream 
frequency has at times been shown to be directly or indirectly related to factors of personality, 
gender, and intelligence (Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Blagrove & Hartnell, 2000; Blagrove & 
Tucker, 1994; Gackenbach, 1981; Galvin, 1990; Schredl & Erlacher, 2004).   
For instance, Blagrove and Hartnell (2000) found that lucid dreamers scored significantly 
higher than non-lucid dreamers on measures of ‘need for cognition’, ‘creativity’ and ‘internal 
locus of control’.  In other words, individuals who reported lucid dreaming were more creative, 
had a higher need for thought, and were more likely to attribute events in their life to factors 
under their own control and not to those controlled by others or to chance.  The authors note 
that the construct ‘need for cognition’ was been negatively correlated with ‘closed mindedness’ 
and ‘need for social desirability’ and positively correlated with general intelligence in another 
study (Cacioppo, 1982). 
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Schredl and Erlacher (Schredl & Erlacher, 2004), investigated the relationship between 
personality and lucid dream frequency using the Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness 
Personality Inventory (Ostendorf, 1994), the Tellegen and Atkinson personality inventory 
(Tellegen, 1974), and the Boundary Questionnaire (Hartmann, 1991).  Their results showed that 
82% of their sample of 444 college students had experienced a lucid dream at some point in 
their life.  Lucid dream frequency was most closely related to dream recall but was not 
significantly associated with any of the personality factors they assessed.  A replication of this 
study (Patrick & Durndell, 2004) found that both frequent and occasional lucid dreamers 
demonstrated a more internal locus of control and greater need for cognition measure than did 
nonlucid dreamers.  Frequent but not occasional lucid dreamers demonstrated greater field 
independence than nonlucid dreamers.  These personality factors - need for cognition, internal 
locus of control, and field independence – were all correlated with one other. The authors 
suggested that their results argued for continuity between ‘styles’ of waking and dreaming 
personality. 
More recently, the authors of the former study attempted to better characterize lucid 
dream frequency in the general population (Schredl & Erlacher, 2011).  Their results, with a 
considerably larger sample including non-students, found that about half of those asked had 
experienced a lucid dream at least once during their lifetime.  The authors also found a high-
moderate correlation, once again, between lucid dream frequency and dream recall.  While 
women and younger individuals were found to be more likely to have lucid dreams in their 
sample, this finding was confounded with dream recall.  None of the other demographic 
variables assessed in their study were related to lucid dream frequency. 
In general, sex and age differences in lucid dream frequency have ranged from minimal 
to nonexistent.  In the only study of lucid dream frequency in children, it was found that the 
recall of lucid dreams may decline with age, peaking at around the age of ten.  In this same 
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study, boys recalled slightly fewer lucid dreams than girls overall (Armstrong-Kickey, 1988).  
Conversely, in at least one study of adult and college student samples, no sex differences were 
demonstrated with respect to lucid dream frequency (Gackenbach, 1985). 
Overall, more frequent lucid dreaming has been consistently associated with greater 
field independence, an internal locus of control, and a greater need for cognition and less 
consistently with vestibular sensitivity, creativity, and intelligence (Blagrove & Hartnell, 2000; 
Blagrove & Tucker, 1994; Gackenbach, 1984; Schredl & Erlacher, 2004).  It appears that 
perhaps the most reliable factor to be associated with lucid dream frequency however is dream 
recall (Brooks, 2008; Gackenbach, 1981; LaBerge, 1990b, 2000; Paulsson & Parker, 2006; 
Purcell et al., 1986; Schredl & Erlacher, 2011; Schredl & Erlacher, 2004).  This association, 
perhaps due to the fact that it appears self-evident, is often glossed over or interpreted only in 
the most straightforward manner.  That is, it is necessary to first know whether a lucid dream 
has occurred in order for it to be reported.  If an individual has poor dream recall, they are less 
likely to report any dreams, let alone lucid ones.  However, there may be more to the 
association between dream recall and lucidity than is immediately apparent.   
It appears plausible that lucid dreams are more likely to be recalled than non-lucid 
dreams.  While it would be difficult (if not impossible) to adequately test such a claim, if true, it 
might suggest that the capacity of the lucid dreamer for dream recall is, for whatever reason, 
greater than that of a non-lucid dreamer.  Though a more thorough discussion is presented later 
(See ‘Dream Self-Reflectiveness’), some further explanation of this idea is worth noting here. 
Some have suggested the existence of a developmental continuum of ‘dream ego’ 
awareness (Kozmová & Wolman, 2006; Purcell et al., 1986; Rossi, 2000).  At the low end of this 
continuum is the undeveloped dream ego for which dream recall is almost entirely absent.  At 
the opposite end is a fully developed dream ego that is integrated with the waking self and for 
which fully controllable lucid dreaming may occur frequently (Purcell et al., 1986; Rossi, 2000).  
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In this view, those with greater ‘dream ego’ awareness would be hypothesized not only to 
demonstrate greater recall of prior dreams, but also greater levels of lucidity in dreams as well.  
There is extensive, albeit largely anecdotal, support for such a theory (Brooks, 2008), but more 
research is certainly needed in this area. 
Questions about whether certain psychological characteristics are necessary 
preconditions for lucid dreaming or whether they are simply developed in parallel to lucid dream 
ability cannot be conclusively answered given the available evidence.  Still, findings such as 
those described above suggest that lucid dreaming may not develop in isolation from other 
psychological factors.  More importantly though, while these studies have shown that certain 
psychological characteristics may be associated with the ability to achieve lucidity they do not 
necessarily suggest that these functions are either necessary for nor exclusive to lucid dreams. 
Cognition 
Lucid dreamers often report having many of their waking cognitive faculties at their 
disposal during their lucid dreams.  During a lucid dream, the dreamer may have the ability to 
remember the conditions of waking, recognize the bizarre or otherwise salient elements of the 
dream, make choices and willfully carry out intentions (Carskadon, 1995).  Theoretically, lucid 
dreaming appears to be reliant upon what would traditionally be considered executive functions 
and, as a rule, involves a degree of metacognitive monitoring in order to maintain the 
awareness that one is dreaming (Kahan & Laberge, 1994a).  LaBerge has described lucidity as 
the ability of the dreamer to “…reason clearly … and act as they wish upon reflection” though he 
properly qualifies this statement, noting that lucid dreamers “do not always possess these 
abilities to a great extent,” (LaBerge, 1985a).  Still, one recent study demonstrated that relative 
to non-lucid dreams, reports from lucid dreams contain significantly more references to choice, 
sustained attention, and private self-reflection (Rider et al., 2012).   
Higher lucid dream frequency has been associated with better Stroop performance 
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(Blagrove et al., 2010) – a task which has been shown to activate the dorsolateral prefrontal and 
anterior cingulate cortices.  Conversely, performances on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, a 
task that engages the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were not significantly related to ‘lucid dream 
characteristics’ (Neider et al., 2011).  High frequency lucid dreamers did not demonstrate any 
difference compared with low frequency lucid dreamers or non-lucid dreamers on a measure of 
change blindness (Blagrove & Wilkinson, 2010).  Lucidity has also been related to performance 
on the Iowa Gambling Task, which has been shown to engage ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(Neider et al., 2011).   
Generally, cognitive functions that have traditionally been associated with dorsolateral 
prefrontal (i.e. reasoning and problem solving), anterior cingulate (i.e. decision making and 
motivated behavior), and orbitofrontal (i.e. maintenance of set, self-monitoring) cortical 
functioning appear to be more common in lucid versus non-lucid dreams.  Despite a wealth of 
anecdotal reports of such high level cognition during lucid dreaming however, very few studies 
have investigated this claim empirically.  The dearth of studies in this area may a byproduct of 
the tenuous nature of drawing conclusions based on self-reports on cognitive functioning, 
particularly cognitive functioning recalled from a previously dreamed experience.  The reliance 
on imperfectly recalled subjective reports as indices of experiences is, however, an issue which 
has been grappled with and addressed in countless studies of dreaming and of psychology 
more broadly and one which is addressed more thoroughly below (see Limitations).  
Fortunately, a significant amount of research attention has been devoted to the induction of 
lucid dreams, which can also provide insight into the nature of cognition in both non-lucid and 
lucid dreaming. 
Induction 
Existing lucid dream induction methods use targeted attentional and mnemonic practices 
to attempt to increase the probability of lucid dreaming.  While many of these techniques will be 
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reviewed below, this overview is not intended to be exhaustive (for such a review, see 
Gackenbach & LaBerge, 1988).  The purpose of this review is to provide the background 
necessary to infer the underlying neuropsychological mechanisms involved in lucid dream 
induction and to demonstrate how mindfulness may be related to dream lucidity.  
Many practices for inducing lucid dreams focus on preparation or interventions aimed at 
adjusting waking patterns of thought and behavior to increase the probability of lucidity in 
dreaming.  For instance, a technique referred to as “cycle adjustment” (Levitan, 1992) take 
advantage of inherent circadian rhythms for alertness.  The high state of physiological arousal in 
the early morning hours, which peaks at the time of awakening due to circadian 
neuromodulation from the SCN (Nielsen, 2004), is particularly conducive for lucid dreaming 
(Levitan, 1992; Price et al., 1991).  In a pilot study by LaBerge and colleagues, participants were 
asked to record the times they awakened during the night or in the morning as well as whether 
they awakened from a dream or a lucid dream for a period of one week.  Almost 60% of 
participants had a lucid dream during this period and 7.6% of awakenings were from lucid 
dreams (much higher than the estimated frequency of spontaneous lucid dreams in the general 
population).  The overwhelming majority of lucid dreams (90%) occurred during the last 4 hours 
of the sleep period (Levitan, 1992).   
Other wake-based lucid dream induction methods rely on intentional pre-sleep self-
suggestion.  German psychologist Paul Tholey pioneered the technique (Tholey, 1983a) which 
typically involves setting one’s intention to remember to ask the question “Am I dreaming?” 
while dreaming.  The aim is to routinize this behavior (i.e. state-testing) by posing the question 
as many times as can be remembered each day.  This approach is often referred to as ‘intention 
and suggestion’, “reflection’, or ‘reflection-intention’ (LaBerge, 1990a; Paulsson & Parker, 2006). 
The question should not be answered without some critical inspection first, perhaps by 
attempting to perform some action that would not be possible in waking (e.g. trying to float) or 
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dreaming (e.g. trying to use some man-made device like a light switch).   
Since this approach relies heavily on intentional multiple cognitive processes including 
encoding the intention to ask the question; retrieval of the intention to carry it out; recognition of 
the appropriate retrieval context; faithful execution of the question; and the correct assessment 
of one’s state, it can be said to fall under the rubric of prospective memory. Brain areas 
supporting these functions, particularly frontal regions and the precuneus are typically 
deactivated during REM sleep, compared with waking (Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2003; Maquet & 
Phillips, 1998; Maquet et al., 2005).  It has been shown that cue-based prospective memory is 
more reliable than other forms of prospective memory (i.e. time-based) (Cheng, 2008) which 
may explain why cueing is used so frequently with this type of induction technique.  For 
instance, Clerc suggests writing the letter ‘C’ on one’s hand to serve as a reminder to ask the 
critical question (Tholey, 1983b), while LaBerge recommends pairing the state-test with 
approximately five to ten typically occurring events per day.  Reflection/Intention procedures are 
among the few empirically tested lucid dream induction techniques which have been shown to 
be effective both for people who have had lucid dreams and those who have not (Paulsson & 
Parker, 2006).   
Lucid awareness training is an “attempt to promote a particular attitude or state of 
consciousness during wakefulness,” – a state of “heightened perceptual awareness” (Price et 
al., 1991).  This approach arises from the idea that the majority of us are typically in a state of 
dampened awareness.  The goal of lucid awareness training is to cultivate this heightened state 
of awareness using waking practice, akin to mindfulness, with the expectation that, through 
regular practice, this state will eventually become more accessible while dreaming.   
Alpha-frequency brainwave entrainment has also been used in attempts to induce lucid 
dreams.  The rationale behind using alpha entrainment were studies of meditators which 
observed that concentrative meditation had the effect of increasing the amount of alpha activity 
Mindfulness and Dreaming 39 
 
in the resting EEG.  Ogilvie, Hunt, and others (Ogilvie, 1982a) had a group of 10 good dream 
recallers spend 2 nights in the sleep lab.  The experimenters awakened the participants 
periodically during the night from REM sleep, twice during their highest alpha activity period, 
and twice while levels of alpha were at their lowest.  In addition, half of the participants were 
given alpha feedback training prior to sleep onset, both to familiarize them with the feeling 
associated with alpha activity, and to train them to induce this activity.  The authors 
hypothesized that alpha training might thus lead to a greater awareness in dreams.  Their 
results indicated that arousals during high alpha periods were associated with significantly 
higher lucidity ratings.  However, alpha feedback training had no significant effect upon lucid 
dream frequency or REM alpha levels (Ogilvie, 1982a).    
In another study by Hunt and McCleod (1988), investigated the interrelation of dream 
bizarreness, lucidity, and meditation practice in long-term meditators.  Participants were asked 
to rate their own dreams as either lucid, control/prelucid, or non-lucid and estimate their total 
number of lucid, control, and prelucid dreams over the preceding year.  The authors also rated 
each dream collected during the study on their own seven point lucidity scale.  Years of 
meditation practice was found to be significantly and positively related to estimated lucid dream 
frequency over the previous year.   
LaBerge investigated the effects of intense concentration, practiced in the morning or 
evening, on lucid dream frequency in a small sample of participants.  No measures of alpha 
activity were included in his study, nor were there any subjective measures of awareness.  Even 
with a small sample of participants, results suggested that intense concentration for fifteen 
minutes in the evening was associated with a higher probability of lucid dreaming than when the 
same practice was performed during the morning (Levitan, 1992).  
Malamud (1979) and Sparrow (1976) both produced doctoral dissertations detailing 
methods for developing lucid awareness during waking for the purposes of lucid dream 
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induction.  Malamud’s approach involved “re-dreaming” past experiences and dreams through 
active visualization during waking.  Participants were instructed to attempt to visualize a better 
outcome to their dreams with the expectation that this would engender lucid awareness in future 
dreams.  Unfortunately, her results were inconclusive with regard to whether this practice 
increased dream self-reflectiveness.  However, she did demonstrate a measurable increase in 
participants’ self-reflection during waking. 
Lucid dream induction practices which focus on dreaming are typically concerned with 
the recognition of some unusual dream element that may originate from within the dream or 
delivered through some exogeneous means (i.e. dreamsigns).  A dreamsign may be defined as 
"a peculiar event or object in a dream that can be used as an indicator that you are dreaming" 
(Levitan, 1992).  In a series of early experiments published in the Lucidity Institute’s newsletter, 
LaBerge and colleagues identified four broad categories of dreamsigns including 1) ego-related 
anomalies; 2) character-related anomalies; 3) object-related anomalies; and 4) setting-related 
anomalies.  These were later refined to include dreamsigns related to inner awareness, action, 
form and context.  Of these, frequency of inner awareness and action dreamsigns correlated 
significantly with lucid dream frequency, suggesting that practices aimed at enhancing inner 
awareness and action during waking, such as mindfulness, might facilitate the recognition of 
these dreamsigns, thus increasing the likelihood of lucid dreaming. 
Dreamsigns can also originate from exogeneous stimuli.  One example of this approach 
is the Nova Dreamer, developed by LaBerge and colleagues at the Lucidity Institute (Kottke, 
1996).  The Nova Dreamer utilizes a sleep mask with embedded ocular sensors, LED’s over the 
eyes, and a small speaker.  The detection of REMs by the ocular sensors triggers the delivery of 
flashing light stimulation via the embedded LED’s and/or low level auditory stimulation from the 
internal speakers.  The principle behind the Nova Dreamer is that external stimuli often become 
incorporated in dream content.  In the example of the Nova Dreamer, the flashing LED’s may 
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become a flashing stoplight while the sound from the speakers may become an alarm in the 
dream.  The Lucidity Institute’s website offers several accounts of how the light stimulation has 
been manifest in dream content (The Lucidity Institute, 2009).  However, this integration of the 
stimuli into the dream is often not enough to trigger a lucid dream.  The dreamer must still 
recognize the flashes or sounds as originating from the Nova Dreamer, then must also perform 
a reality test and accurately determine that he or she is dreaming.  Thus, even with the aid of 
exogeneous stimulation, the dreamer’s capacity for reflective awareness, volition, and logical 
reasoning would still appear to be necessary components for successful lucid dream induction. 
The mnemonic induction of lucid dreams (MILD) is actually a set of practices aimed at 
the development of various abilities including dream recall, anomaly detection, prospective 
memory, and critical state testing.  The dreamer awakens, typically in the early morning, and 
attempts to recall the most recent dream as completely possible.  After engaging in some 
activity while awake, the individual returns to sleep, concentrating single-mindedly on the 
intention to remember to recognize that he or she is dreaming.  While continuing to focus on this 
intention, one imagines being back in the dream and imagines recognizing that it is a dream.  
This process continues until the intention is firmly set or until the individual falls asleep 
(LaBerge, 1995).   
LaBerge admits the MILD technique is “difficult to teach [to] people who have no 
experience with lucid dreaming” and suggests that MILD is more appropriate for individuals who 
wish to learn to induce lucid dreams at will (Price et al., 1991).  The current evidence seems to 
support this position.  While those without experience with lucid dreaming may not find MILD 
particularly effective, this approach boasts impressive rates of improvement in people with some 
familiarity with lucid dreaming and is the only method which has been demonstrated to allow 
individuals to have lucid dreams at will (LaBerge, 1990a). 
Another set of techniques is aimed at the transition from waking to dreaming and are 
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sometimes referred to as ‘Hypnogogic Techniques’ (Price et al., 1991) or wake induced lucid 
dream (WILD) techniques.  These practices focus on developing the dreamer’s capacity to 
maintain self-awareness throughout the changeover from waking to dreaming consciousness.  
Since REM sleep does not typically emerge until about 90 minutes into sleep, these practices 
tend to be suited to the early morning hours, after an awakening, when the propensity to enter 
directly into REM sleep is highest.  
LaBerge argues that the maintenance of awareness through the early stages of sleep is 
also a learnable skill (LaBerge, 1980).  He suggests that this type of lucid dream initiation draws 
on an individual’s ability to engage in active self-reflection and ability to remember to recognize 
that the hypnogogic imagery is part of the developing dream.  However, simply attempting to 
keep one’s awareness sustained while falling asleep is a vague and difficult task to accomplish.  
Unlike Tibetan dream yoga, wherein the dreamer has some mental imagery on which to focus, 
such a “pure awareness” approach involves no special emphasis on specific thoughts or 
imagery.  Often, this technique is used in the context of waking up from a dream, then falling 
back into sleep with conscious awareness intact.  One practice which gives attention something 
to focus on is a variation of the classic “counting oneself to sleep” (LaBerge, 1990a).  The 
variation comes with the insertion of the phrase “I’m dreaming” between each ascending 
number, so that the dreamer’s internal dialogue consists of something akin to “one, I’m 
dreaming…two, I’m dreaming, three, etc.”  Presumably this counting procedure would continue 
until the statement “I’m dreaming” occurred within a dream.  This method appears to be less 
reliant on prospective memory processes, as it has the state-testing question ‘built-in’.  
However, the type of passivity needed in order for the dream imagery to fully develop is almost 
in conflict with the method itself, which requires active, intentional cognitive processing.  
Section Summary 
Based on the preceding review of lucid dream research, several conclusions may be 
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drawn.  With respect to the neurophysiology of lucid dreaming, it can be said that lucid dreams 
do appear to emerge most frequently from the more physiologically active state of REM sleep 
(i.e. phasic REM) than from any other stage.  Thus, the neuropsychological model of REM sleep 
dreaming as proposed by Hobson and colleagues (Hobson et al., 1998) should be modified to 
include the potential emergence of lucidity.  Furthermore, it has been shown that many lucidly 
dreamed behaviors are associated with patterns of neural activation similar to their waking 
actual or imagined analogs.  Taken together, these findings point to a potential continuity in the 
nature of the brain-behavior relationships between waking experience and REM sleep lucid 
dreams.   
Overall, this broad view of the physiological, personality, and cognitive factors 
associated with lucid dreaming suggests that it is a relatively high-level state of consciousness 
compared with normative dreaming or even, perhaps, ‘normative’ waking states.   
Even more relevant to the present study, a review of the lucid dream literature reveals a striking 
similarity to high-level meditative and mindful states as observed during waking and suggests 
that certain attentional, executive, and metacognitive processes are critical to lucidity.  
As discussed in the sections above on sleep physiology and dream neuropsychology, 
the particular set of cognitive functions that are ‘available’ during REM sleep and the capacity of 
a dreamer to employ those functions during a dream are both likely to be limited by the 
physiological and neurochemical state of the brain.  That lucid dreaming exists at all is still 
poorly explained given the current models of the neurobiological basis of REM sleep – a fact 
which begs further explanation.  The final piece of this review which is intended to serve as the 
basis for an expanded model of dream neuropsychology concerns the continuity theory of 
dreaming.  This theory is critical to the assumptions of the present study and may provide some 
insight into how and why lucidity is possible.  
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Continuity Theory 
Traditionally, dreaming has been viewed as phenomenological dissimilar and cognitively 
deficient compared to waking (Hobson et al., 2000; Rechtschaffen, 1978).  Over the past 50 
years however, a theory which emphasizes the similarity between waking and dreaming has 
challenged this view.  What began with a finding which initially surprised many dream 
researchers, demonstrating that narrative reports of REM sleep dreams can be thematically 
indistinguishable from narrative reports of waking experiences (Snyder et al., 1968), has grown 
into a robust and empirically supported theory that has significantly altered our understanding of 
the relationship between waking and dreaming.   
Simply stated, the continuity theory of dreams (also referred to as the continuity 
hypothesis) holds that dreaming and waking are reliant upon the same underlying brain-mind 
processes (Neider et al., 2011).  Therefore, the structural and process features of both states 
should be, to some extent, continuous with one another.  Sigmund Freud is perhaps the most 
prominent early advocate of this basic idea, as he theorized that dreams reflected unexpressed 
waking wishes and desires (Freud, 1955).  As has been described above however, our 
understanding of dream neuropsychology has advanced significantly since Freud’s 
Interpretation of Dreams and there are now clear neurobiological constraints to which any 
theory relating waking and dreaming phenomena must ultimately conform.   
A large and growing body of empirical evidence has refined the continuity hypothesis 
(Collerton & Perry, 1995; Gackenbach et al., 2011; King & DeCicco, 2009; Maggiolini et al., 
2010; Nielsen et al., 2004; Noreika, 2011; Pesant & Zadra, 2006; Roussy et al., 1996; Samson 
& Dekoninck, 1986; Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003; Schredl et al., 1998; Voss et al., 
2011) and recent efforts have been made to reconcile continuity theory with the current 
understanding of dream neuropsychology (Domhoff, 2011).  A brief, selective review of studies 
which have helped to clarify continuity theory is presented here with an emphasis on those 
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findings which are particularly relevant to the present study (For a more thorough review, see 
Domhoff, 1996). 
The continuity hypothesis still maintains that dream content reflects waking experiences 
and concerns, but its modern formulation represents a significant departure from Freud’s theory.  
The issue of whether dreams simply reflect ‘daily residue’ or also material from the more distant 
past was taken up by Nielsen and colleagues (Nielsen et al., 2004).  Their results suggested 
maximal incorporation of waking content into subsequent dreams comes from experiences 
occurring on the day preceding the dream and as well as those occurring approximately one 
week prior (Nielsen et al., 2004).  While the U-shaped curve representing the timing of 
incorporation is still largely unexplained, several factors appear to exert significant influence on 
the rate of incorporation.  These include the type and emotional valence of the experience as 
well as the dreamer’s own personality characteristics (Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Hofmann, 
2003). With respect to the types of waking material which become incorporated into dream 
narratives, it appears that experiences of conflict are the most frequently included, particularly in 
nightmares (Chivers & Blagrove, 1999; Delorme et al., 2002; Levin & Nielsen, 2007).  While 
these and other studies have provided convincing evidence that thematic content is continuous 
between waking and dreaming, there remains some question of whether and to what degree 
cognitive functioning is also continuous.  Do higher or lower levels of waking cognitive function 
correlate with higher or lower levels of these same cognitive functions in dreams?  A few studies 
suggest this is so. 
A series of studies investigating continuity and discontinuity of cognitive process features 
across waking and dreaming (Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & LaBerge, 2011) provides compelling 
evidence that REM dreams are far from single-minded and, in fact, are capable of supporting 
what are traditionally considered higher level cognitive processes.  While participants’ self-
reports of choice, reflective awareness on one’s own behavior, and reflective awareness on 
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one’s own thoughts or feelings, were reported significantly more frequently in waking compared 
with dreaming – none of the above were absent from dreams.  Furthermore, self-reported 
measures of sudden attention, focused attention, and reflective awareness on external events 
were not even significantly different between the two states (Kahan & LaBerge, 2011).  The 
authors conclude that: “High-order cognition is much more common in dreams than has been 
assumed…” and that, “continuity theory now has evidence for not only the similarities of mental 
content throughout states, but also similarities at the process levels of cognition.” 
Earlier, reference was made to a potential link between the neurocognitive bases of 
dreaming and the brain’s default mode network. Now that there is some evidence to support 
that dreaming and waking are likely continuous with respect to structural and process features, 
it is appropriate to revisit Domhoff’s neurocognitive theory of dreaming and its implications for 
the relationship between mindfulness in waking and lucidity in dreams.  As mentioned, 
Domhoff’s theory draws heavily from research into the behavioral correlates of the default mode 
network.  In fMRI studies of the brain during a resting state, individuals often report mind 
wandering, day-dreaming, and internal simulation of past or future autobiographical events 
(Hasenkamp et al., 2012).  This has been associated with activity across a network of structures 
referred to as the default mode network.  Domhoff posits that the similarity between mind-
wandering and dreaming is suggestive of a similar, underlying neurobiology.  In other words, the 
continuity observed between the contents of waking and dreaming may have its neurological 
basis within the default mode network (this point will be taken up once again in the section on 
dream mindfulness below).   
Taken together, the evidence presented in these studies appears to converge in support 
of the continuity hypothesis, which is the primary theoretical basis of the present study.  Within 
the constraints set by those aspects of continuity theory which have empirical support, the 
hypothesis that waking levels of trait mindfulness might be reflected in some aspect of dreaming 
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cognition appears to be theoretically sound.  In the final section, consideration will be given to 
several possible ‘dream analogues’ to waking mindfulness: lucidity, dream self-reflectiveness, 
and dream mindfulness. 
Mindfulness and Dreaming 
As might be gathered from the review of lucid dream research presented earlier, the idea 
that there are waking correlates of dream lucidity is not new.  Suspected relationships between 
various aspects of waking awareness and dream lucidity have been addressed in a variety of 
studies with mixed results.  Price (1991) has argued that awareness training as a lucid dream 
induction practice may be most effective when a synthesis of dreaming and waking awareness 
occurs, an idea which was central to a theory proposed by Ernest Rossi (2000).  Rossi suggests 
that such a synthesis is contingent on the development of ‘self-reflectiveness’ in waking (Rossi, 
2000) which, he proposes, is manifest as increased self-reflectiveness in dreams.  Given the 
clear relevance of Rossi’s theory to the assumptions of the present study, a brief review of the 
basic tenets of his model and a series of studies which have attempted to test it will now be 
reviewed. 
Dream Self-Reflectiveness 
According to Rossi (2000), human psychological growth and development occurs when 
individuals synthesize new perspectives and experiences with old ones in a dialectical and 
dynamic process that is mediated by self-reflection.  This process is viewed as cyclical, 
occurring in four interrelated stages.  During each stage, an individual’s degree of self-reflection 
is presumed to be apparent in the content and process features of both waking and dreaming 
experiences.  At the initial stage an individual may lack self-awareness and operate primarily on 
habitual patterns of behavior.  Dreams experienced at this stage would involve the dreamer 
experiencing restriction, entrapment, or limited capacity for action and their responses to the 
dream environment would be primarily reactive and automatic.  At stage two, the individual 
Mindfulness and Dreaming 48 
 
begins to break out of habitual action patterns but without having stabilized new patterns of 
action, dreams at this stage reflect conflict or bifurcation of the self as well as increased 
bizarreness that is frightening to the dreamer.  As the resolution of this conflict approaches 
completion and an individual experiences a shift toward a newly stabilized pattern of more 
adaptive behaviors dream themes involve more “creative” elements and are laden with bizarre 
elements that are not viewed as frightening, but rather as humorous, strange, or simply illogical.  
Additionally, dream awareness may become more detached or divided, with the dreamer 
capable of witnessing and participating in the dream simultaneously.  Rossi describes stage four 
as one in which a newly stabilized self seeks to continue the process which has brought it into 
existence.  Dream content at this stage would reflect a dreamer who directs his or her dream 
toward some desired outcome, solving dream dramas in constructive ways, or even having 
more frequent lucid dreams.  The achievement of psychosynthesis then would be presumably 
related to the development of the highest form of dream self-reflectiveness - lucid control 
dreams.   
Purcell and colleagues adapted Rossi’s model of dream self-reflectiveness into a nine-
category hierarchical scale referred to as the ‘Dream Self-reflectiveness Scale’ (Purcell et al., 
1986).  Lower level categories were designed to reflect the types of dreams associated with the 
earlier stages of Rossi’s model while higher level categories were to reflect more advanced 
stages.  When the authors applied this scale to the content of dreams from different stages of 
sleep, they found that the greatest degree of self-reflectiveness occurred during dreams from 
REM sleep.  Purcell and colleagues (Purcell, 1987; Purcell et al., 1986) also investigated the 
effects on dream self-reflectiveness of various types of ‘attention to dreams’ training protocols 
including training in dream reporting, training in dream reporting as well as a manualized 
program to enhance dream self-reflectiveness, training in dream reporting, dream self-
reflectiveness, and mnemonic techniques for inducing lucid dreams, and hypnosis with the 
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suggestion to participants to become lucid in their dreams.  Of all the techniques administered 
to the experimental groups, the mnemonic technique was the most effective for increasing lucid 
dream frequency and was associated with greater dream self-reflectiveness compared with any 
other group.  Dream self-reflectiveness training was not significantly better at raising scores on 
the dream self-reflectiveness scale than any other method, though several participants who 
underwent this training did have lucid dreams during the study. 
While these studies do not directly test Rossi’s model of psychosynthesis, they do 
conceptualize dream awareness as a continuum which was a novel approach at that time.  This 
approach has not been widely used due, in part to the fact that lucidity lends itself to 
dichotomization (i.e. a dream is either lucid or it is not).  Nonetheless, the present study also 
conceptualizes dream lucidity as a continuum, with non-lucid, pre-lucid, and lucid dreams 
representing possibilities for dream awareness which fall at different points along the continuum.  
In addition to operationalizing lucidity as a continuous variable, a novel experimental construct 
termed ‘Dream Mindfulness’ was also used and will now be discussed in detail.  
Dream Mindfulness 
It has been demonstrated that mindfulness meditation training can lead to improvements 
in cognitive flexibility, visuo-spatial processing, working memory, executive functioning, and 
metacognitive functioning (Hargus et al., 2010; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Zeidan et al., 2010) 
– all of which appear to be important for lucid dreaming.  Several studies have demonstrated 
that, compared with non-meditators, individuals who practice meditation have significantly more 
frequent lucid dreams (Gackenbach et al., 1986; Hunt & Ogilvie, 1989; Hunt & Ogilvie, 1988).  
Furthermore, as Hunt (1989) has stated, lucid dreaming is actually a meditative state which is 
sought in certain meditative practices.  Advanced practitioners of transcendental meditation for 
example, claim to maintain awareness through a large proportion of their sleep – a state often 
referred to as ‘dream witnessing’ (Travis, 1994).   
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While awareness training and meditation training may induce or increase the frequency 
of lucid dreams, the relationship between mindfulness in waking and lucidity in dreams has still 
not been clearly characterized.  Purcell and colleagues used the construct of dream self-
reflectiveness to refer to the set of cognitive and metacognitive processes that, when fully 
developed, would give rise to lucid dreaming.  The term ‘dream mindfulness’ may be more 
appropriate term for capturing the particular constellation of cognitive functions most often 
associated with lucidity.   
In waking, ‘mindfulness’ implies a continual, moment-to-moment presence of mind within 
which an individual is capable of either passively observing or actively engaging with the 
environment in a nonreactive, nonjudgmental (i.e. accepting) manner.  Mindfulness practice has 
been shown to have a profound impact on the function of the default mode network (Brewer et 
al., 2011; Farb et al., 2007; Holzel et al., 2011; Holzel et al., 2007; Taylor et al., 2011).  One 
recent study demonstrated that different types of meditation practice can differentially impact the 
functional connectivity of brain regions as imaged during resting state.  Specifically, an anti-
correlation between extrinsic and intrinsic brain systems was stronger during a form of focused 
attentional meditation and weaker during a non-dual awareness style of meditation when both 
were compared to a fixation condition (i.e. without mediation).  The authors conclude that ‘the 
anti-correlation found between extrinsic and intrinsic systems is not an immutable property of 
brain organization and that practicing different forms of meditation can modulate this gross 
functional organization in profoundly different ways’ (Josipovic et al., 2012).   
Domhoff proposes that the parallel between mind wandering and dreaming is supported 
by the finding that neural recruitment during resting state is strongest when subjects were 
unaware of their own mind wandering (Christoff et al., 2009).  He suggests that mind wandering 
may be: 
“…more pronounced when it lacks meta-awareness.  A lack of ‘‘meta-awareness’’ is 
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reminiscent of the ‘‘single-mindedness’’ of dreams, with dreamers rarely aware that they are 
dreaming (Rechtschaffen, 1978, 1997). The parallels between the lack of meta-awareness 
during dreaming and the failure to encode external events during mind wandering may provide 
an opening to a cognitive explanation, in terms of a lack of focused attention when the mind is 
involved in simulation, for why both dreams and drifting waking thoughts are usually soon 
forgotten” 
One logical hypothesis given what is known about the relationship between mindfulness 
meditation and this default mode network (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012; Hasenkamp et al., 
2012; Josipovic et al., 2012) is that a mindful brain would be more aware of its wandering during 
waking.  To extend this to dreaming, individuals who are more mindful in waking would likely 
demonstrate more coherent dreams with concurrently higher levels of attentional control, self-
awareness, and more thoughtful, volitional (i.e. non-reactive) self actions.   
Thus, higher levels of dream mindfulness are conceptualized in this study as a 
concurrently greater capacity of the dreamer to: 1) Control attention by sustaining it and/or 
shifting it willfully; 2) Think/reflect on the events of the dream while dreaming; 4) Have 
awareness of his or her own thoughts, behaviors, sensations, and emotions; 5) Engage in 
volitional behavior (i.e. be aware of choices, make decisions, and act on those decisions) and; 
6) Control or manipulate elements of the dream (self, objects, characters, environment).  It is 
important to state here that, while ‘dream mindfulness’ is hypothesized to be related to lucidity, it 
is likely that even non-lucid dreams involve some degree of these functions.  Based on the 
current understanding of the factors affecting incorporation of thematic content from waking into 
dreaming, it also seems likely that temporal fluctuations in levels of waking mindfulness will 
impact the degree to which dreams are more or less mindful.  Dreams following a day of 
focused mindfulness practices, for example, would presumably be more mindful and possibly 
lucid depending on the nature of the practice whereas subsequent dreams (e.g. two or more 
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days after such practice) would be relatively less mindful and less likely to be lucid.  As 
emotional valence has been shown to be an important factor in determining the degree of 
waking-dreaming continuity, the acceptance component of mindfulness practice would likely 
impact the rate of incorporation of daily emotional concerns into dreams as well.  According to 
the current model of continuity theory, if a higher level of acceptance is associated with lower 
emotional valence in waking, it should also be associated with lower emotional valence (i.e. 
intensity), fewer conflicts, and generally a more positive emotional tone to in dreams.  It might 
also be reasoned that a more accepting attitude toward emotional experiences in waking would 
be associated with less frequent nightmares.   
Within the context of continuity theory, it is also reasonable to predict a relationship 
between waking levels mindfulness, particularly the attentional component of mindfulness, and 
sensory experiences in dreaming.  Specifically, an individual who is keenly attentive to sensory 
phenomena in waking may be both more attuned to their dreamed sensory experience and 
perhaps more likely to dream more vividly.  It could be further hypothesized that the modalities 
most frequently or intensely attended to in waking would be the same modalities which would be 
more vividly experienced in dreams.  For example, a mindfulness practitioner who regularly 
attends to their sense of movement through space in waking might report more intense 
vestibular or proprioceptive sensations in dreams.    
Extending continuity theory to account for a presumed relationship between the 
neuropsychological functions associated with mindfulness practice is, for several reasons, not 
as straightforward.  The neurophysiological state of the brain during the dream could vary 
depending on the stage of sleep during which the dream occurs, introducing a variable set of 
biological constraints on any continuity of neuropsychological functioning.  Nonetheless, 
presuming there is continuity of function, it might still be predicted that an individual’s particular 
neuropsychological profile would be consistent between waking and dreaming.  That is, the 
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idiosyncratic pattern of cognitive strengths and weaknesses that can be observed on formal 
testing should be consistent across waking and dreaming states, mediated by the availability of 
neural resources, if dreaming and waking are reliant upon a shared underlying brain basis.  A 
direct test of this hypothesis would be difficult however, since sleeping individuals would not 
likely perform to the best of their ability on tests of neuropsychological functioning and in-dream 
administration is not yet a possibility.3 
Section Summary 
Continuity theory has become one of the prevailing explanations for how dreams take on 
their unique forms.  Support for this theory has come from studies of dream content, dream 
cognition, and dream neuropsychology.  Though the balance of research in this area has 
focused on continuity of the thematic contents of waking into dreaming, it has been suggested 
that at least some cognitive processes are also continuous across the two states.  The 
overarching aim of this study is to investigate whether the waking levels of mindfulness are also 
related to dream content. Specifically, this study will explore the dreaming correlates of waking 
levels of general and recent mindful awareness and acceptance, neuropsychological functions 
in waking, and a variety of dream cognitive, emotional, and sensory experiences.  As argued 
briefly above and discussed in more detail below, it is predicted that self-reported levels of 
dream mindfulness and lucidity will both be positively correlated with self-reported waking levels 
of general and recent mindful awareness and acceptance and also with a set of 
neuropsychological functions that are presumed here to be related to mindfulness including 
sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and 
cognitive set-shifting .  It also stands to reason that there will be a positive relationship between 
                                                             
3  This point may appear to be made in jest but, in fact, it has already been shown that while dreaming lucidly 
individuals can carry out pre-determined activities akin to waking tests of motor function (Dresler et al., 2011; 
Erlacher & Schredl, 2004; Erlacher & Schredl, 2008).  It has also been shown that lucid dreamers can both perceive 
and respond to external stimulation (Kottke, 1996).  Perhaps future research could carry out basic tests of 
response time to prompts delivered through visual or tactile modalities. 
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dream mindfulness and dream lucidity.  Supporting, ancillary hypotheses are also made with 
regard to sensory and emotional experiences in dreams as detailed below and for the presumed 
relationships between waking mindfulness and neuropsychological functioning. 
Chapter Summary and Study Overview 
The continuity theory of dreaming proposes that the phenomenological experience of 
waking and dreaming rely on a shared set of underlying brain-mind processes.  Continuity 
theory has gained increasing empirical support in recent years, with studies demonstrating 
significant relationships between individuals’ experiences during waking and the content of their 
subsequent dreams.  While the bodies of research concerning lucid dreaming and mindfulness 
suggest that these two states may rely on a similar set of cognitive processes, no study has 
addressed the question of whether waking mindfulness skills are related to ‘dream mindfulness’ 
or dream lucidity.  The term dream mindfulness is used here to refer to dream content with 
concurrently higher levels of attention, reflection (i.e. thoughts about the dream), self-
awareness, volition, and dream control.  Dream mindfulness is presumed to be related to dream 
lucidity, or the awareness that one is dreaming. 
Specific Aims and Hypotheses 
This study aimed to investigate whether higher levels of mindfulness skills in waking are 
related to higher levels of dream lucidity and dream mindfulness and whether dream lucidity is, 
itself, related to dream mindfulness (Specific Aim 1).  There were four primary hypotheses 
related to this aim.  First, higher levels of self-reported waking mindfulness skills were expected 
to predict higher ratings of dream lucidity (Hypothesis 1a), and second, to higher ratings of 
dream mindfulness (Hypothesis 1b) (i.e. self-reported attention, reflection, self-awareness, 
volition, and control).  Furthermore, higher ratings of lucidity were predicted to be correlated with 
higher levels of dream mindfulness (Hypothesis 1c).  Higher ratings of dream attention, 
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reflection, self-awareness, volition, and control were hypothesized to be positively associated 
with higher levels of general waking mindfulness and recent mindful awareness and acceptance 
scores (Hypothesis 1d).   
Two ancillary hypotheses were also proposed.  Measures of general and recent waking 
mindfulness were predicted to be related to ratings of emotional intensity in dreams 
(Hypothesis 1e). Specifically, lower levels of recent mindful acceptance were predicted to be 
associated with a greater intensity of negative emotion and a lower intensity of positive emotion.  
Measures of general and recent waking mindfulness were predicted to be related to ratings of 
emotional intensity in dreams (Hypothesis 1f). 
This study also aimed to determine whether neuropsychological measures of sustained 
attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and cognitive set 
shifting in waking are related to dream lucidity and measures of dream mindfulness (i.e. the 
dream mindfulness scale and its subcomponents: self-rated attention, reflection, self-
awareness, volition, and control) (Specific Aim 2). 
Finally, this study sought to determine whether better performance on measures 
sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and 
cognitive set shifting are related to higher levels of self-reported waking mindfulness skills 
(Specific Aim 3).  It was expected that higher levels of self-reported waking mindfulness skills 
would be associated with better performances on these same neuropsychological measures 
(Hypothesis 3). 
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CHAPTER III: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from introductory psychology courses at Drexel University 
through the Drexel SONA system and via printed and in-person solicitations at local meditation 
centers in the Philadelphia region in an attempt to attain a sample reflecting a range of waking 
mindfulness skills.  A total of N=47 healthy participants were enrolled in the study.  Of this 
sample, n=44 (17 male, 25 female; 39 right-hand, 3 left-hand dominant) completed all aspects 
of the study.  Due to non-compliance with part 2 of the protocol, data from 3 participants were 
not included in the final analysis, bringing the total with complete data for analysis of the primary 
hypothesis to N=41(17 male, 24 female).  Age of this sample ranged from 18 to 41 years 
(M=21.2y, SD=4.6y).  Participants’ self-identified race was as follows: 29 
White/Caucasian/European descents, 6 Asian/Asian American, 4 Indian/Indian American, 1 
African American, and 1 participant of Middle Eastern descent.  The highest level of education 
was 2 years post-graduate, with 86% of participants reporting completion of more than 1 but 
less than 4 years of college and 14% having some graduate level education.  All individuals who 
completed the study were entered into a drawing for $200.  Students were awarded extra credit 
for their participation.  The study was reviewed and approved by Drexel University’s Office of 
Regulatory Research Compliance. 
Measures 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Participants first completed a demographics questionnaire (Appendix A), which was 
created and administered by the experimenter to determine eligibility for the study and 
characterize important demographic factors with either known or suspected relationships to the 
study measures.  These included items inquiring about typical sleep and wake habits, dream 
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recall, dream journaling, prior knowledge of or experience with lucid dreaming, nightmare 
frequency, video game and caffeine use, and meditation practice. 
Dream Journal 
The dream journal is a common measure of dreaming.  In a meta-analysis of studies 
investigating dream recall, Schredl and Reinhart (2008) found that the use of a dream diary has 
sufficient reliability for measuring dream recall with good internal consistency (Schredl and 
Fulda, 2005).  The dream journal, in its open ended format, has also been shown to have good 
test-retest reliability (Bernstein and Belicki, 1995, 1996).   The use of the dream journal in the 
current study was intended primarily to provide data for scoring by independent raters for future 
exploratory analyses.  These data were also used as both an ongoing quality control measure 
and to improve compliance with the DES-2 during part 2 of the protocol. 
Participants submitted their dream reports either in person or online at 
Surveymonkey.com.  Participants were asked to report bed time and wake time as well as the 
total number of dreams recalled from the prior night’s sleep.  They were then asked to describe 
one of their dreams from the previous night (whichever one they recalled the best) in a narrative 
format.  It was requested that reports be written in the first-person and in present tense in order 
to facilitate future content analyses.  All identifying information was to be removed at the time of 
entry for confidentiality purposes.  The instructions given at the end of their part 1 session were 
to begin the dream journal the morning after baseline testing was completed to ensure maximal 
temporal proximity to the time of neuropsychological and mindfulness measurements.  The 
instructions were to write as much detail as could be confidently recalled as soon as possible 
after awakening.  Participants were asked not to embellish upon the actual dream content or 
include extraneous information unless necessary to provide relevant context such as the 
relationship between the dreamer and another character in the dream (e.g. family member, 
friend, coworker). 
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Dream Experiences Survey v. 2 
The Dream Experiences Survey is an experimental tool which was first developed by the 
study’s author for a prior study of the relationships between sleep and dream habits and 
neuropsychological performance (Rider et al., 2008).  The items have been adapted and 
expanded for use in the current study.  This survey was administered after the dream narrative 
was submitted each morning during part 2.  The Dream Experiences Survey v. 2 (DES-2) was 
designed specifically to use subjective ratings of dream content variables in order to avoid sole 
reliance on the scoring of dream narratives, post-hoc, to evaluate this study’s hypotheses.4  
Participants were first asked to report how much of the dream they could recall (from 
‘almost none of it’ to ‘all of it’) and whether the dream was a nightmare.  Participants then rated 
their dream on 13, Likert-type items with a range of 1 to 5.  Response options for the overall 
intensity of the dream ranged from ‘not intense at all’ to ‘the most intense dream I’ve had’.  Next, 
ratings of lucidity, based on ‘how close’ participants were to realizing they were dreaming, 
ranged from ‘not at all’ to ‘I realized I was dreaming’.  If participants had a lucid dream during 
the study, they were asked to answer all subsequent items with regard only to the lucid portion 
of their dream.  The remaining scales assessed specific dream content or process 
characteristics.  The intensity of sensory (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory/gustatory, vestibular) 
and emotional experiences (anger, apprehension, sadness, confusion, happiness, other) were 
assessed on scales ranging from ‘not at all’ intense’ to ‘most intense’.  Coherence of the dream 
narrative, attentional control, awareness and action on choices (i.e. volition), control of dream 
elements, participation, self-awareness, and bizarreness were also assessed using 5-point 
Likert scales with examples provided at each level of the scale (for more details see Appendix 
B).  Three subscales were derived from the DES-2 to summarize ratings of sensory intensity 
                                                             
4 The findings of this study will be based solely on subjective report, which is discussed further in the 
limitations section of Chapter V.  However, it is noteworthy here that future analyses are planned in order 
to further evaluate this study’s results with respect to blinded objective ratings as well. 
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(sum of scores on the visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory/olfactory, and vestibular scales), 
negative emotional intensity (average of sadness, anger, and fear/apprehension scales), and 
dream mindfulness (sum of attention, reflection, volition, control, self-awareness scales).  
Mindful Awareness and Attention Scale 
The Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a self-
report scale containing 15 items rated on 6-point Likert type scales (1 = almost always; 6 = 
almost never).  The MAAS yields a single factor of self-report mindfulness.  Specifically, 
participants rated the degree to which they function with or without awareness of present 
experience in cognitive, emotional, interpersonal, and physical domains and generally 
throughout their daily life (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  An example of the type of items on the MAAS 
includes, “I could be experiencing some emotion, and not be conscious of it until sometime 
later.”  The MAAS reliably discriminates between practitioners and non-practitioners of 
mindfulness, and has predictive value in assessing well-being outcomes, with good convergent 
validity with other measures of well-being for adult populations (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Previous 
studies have demonstrated that the MAAS has good test–retest reliability and internal 
consistency, with alpha coefficients ranging from 0.82 to 0.87.  Scores range from 15 to 90, with 
higher total scores indicating greater mindfulness (Schmertz, 2006).  Normative samples exist 
for adults in the general community (N=436; M=4.20; SD=.69) and college students (N=2277; 
M=3.83, SD=.70) (Brown & Ryan, 2003).   Total score on the MAAS was used in the current 
study as a measure of self-reported mindfulness.  Descriptive statistics for the MAAS are 
summarized in Table 1. 
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS) is a 20-item self-report measure which 
assesses both the awareness (i.e. attending) and accepting (i.e. non-judging) components of 
mindfulness.  Individuals are asked to rate the frequency with which they experience certain 
Mindfulness and Dreaming 60 
 
events such as “I am aware of what thoughts are passing through my mind” on the awareness 
subscale and “I try to distract myself when I feel unpleasant emotions” on the acceptance 
subscale.  Frequency is rated from 1 (“Never”) to 5 (“Very Often”).  Scores for each subscale 
are calculated by taking the sum of item scores.  Total scores range from 20 to 100.  Higher 
scores on the awareness subscale are purported to reflect better attentional ability while lower 
scores on the acceptance subscale are indicative of a less accepting, more judgmental attitude.   
The test was developed by Cardaciotto and colleagues (2005) at Drexel University and 
has good internal consistency, and good construct and criterion validity (both convergent and 
predictive).  The PHLMS has an internal consistency of 0.66, which, by some standards, is 
considered low.  However, this is likely due to the fact that higher scores on the awareness 
subscale are indicative of higher levels of attention while higher scores on the acceptance 
subscale are indicative of lower levels of non-judging acceptance.  Because the scales are 
intended to measure both the awareness and acceptance components of mindfulness, it is more 
informative to focus on the alpha levels of the individual subscales.  These are acceptable for 
both the awareness (alpha=.75), and acceptance subscales (alpha=.75).  Correlations between 
scores on the PHLMS and the MAAS were found to be significant, but relatively low (r=.43) 
(Cardaciotto, 2005).  PHLMS total score and awareness and acceptance subscales were 
assessed in the present study.  Descriptive statistics for the present study are summarized in 
Table 1. 
PEBL Neuropsychological Test Battery 
The Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL) v. 0.12 was developed by Shane 
Mueller, Ph.D. and is a freely available, open-source programming tool and experiment 
launcher.  Each participant was administered a neuropsychological test battery running under 
the PEBL launcher in the order listed below.  Unless otherwise indicated all tests were 
administered with default settings.  With the exception of the Subliminally-cued Flicker Paradigm 
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Test, all tests were created and made freely available by Shane Meuller and licensed under the 
General Public License (GPL). 
PEBL Trail Making Test 
The Trail Making Test (Reitan, 1955) is a commonly used neuropsychological measure 
consisting of two parts (A and B).  It is typically given in clinical settings to characterize visual 
attention and sequencing, processing speed, graphomotor speed, and cognitive set shifting 
speed (part B only).  A practice trial is typically administered prior to both parts of the test.  In 
part A, the examinee is presented with a sheet of paper with encircled numbers (1 to 25) 
arranged non-sequentially across the page.  They are then asked to draw a line connecting the 
encircled numbers in their correct numerical order as quickly as possible.  In Part B, the 
encircled items are both numbers (1 to 13) and letters (A through L) and instructions are to 
sequence them in alternating order (i.e. 1-A-2-B-3-C) as quickly and as accurately as possible.  
Other administration criteria vary in clinical settings, such as whether or not the examinee can 
lift his or her pencil once they have started or how quickly the administrator should correct errors 
if they occur.  Time to completion and errors are typically recorded. 
The PEBL version of the Trail Making Test (pTMT) uses an automated algorithm to 
generate each item.  The specific layout of items in the Halstead–Reitan version of Trails A and 
B are included by default among 5 trials of each type.  A standardized set of instructions is 
displayed prior to testing.  Importantly, participants in this study were told they could view the 
arrangement of items as long as they wished prior to commencing the test, but once they 
clicked on the number 1, the timer would start and they should proceed through the remainder 
of the test as quickly as possible. 
The pTMT contained ten trails, alternating between A and B-type trials.  Each part A trial 
had a corresponding B trial (an isomorphic arrangement of items) with an equal distance to 
connect all the items.  The test yielded several measures, including the total time to complete 
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each part, total clicks per trial, accuracy (number of clicks required to complete the trial/total 
clicks), and distance covered.  One previous study demonstrated that, in a large sample, 
completion times and accuracy scores on Parts A and B were all strongly correlated.  Thus, for 
the purposes of this study the average time to complete the A and B trial types were considered 
sufficient to characterize processing speed (pTMT A average completion time) and cognitive set 
shifting speed (pTMT B average completion time).  More information about the PEBL version of 
the Trail Making Test, including additional test characteristics and comparisons with traditional 
versions of the test, are available elsewhere (See Piper et al., 2011). 
PEBL Corsi Block Test 
The Corsi Block-Tapping Test (Corsi, 1972), is a measure of visuospatial working 
memory originally described by Corsi as an indicator of medial temporal lobe function.  It has 
been used widely in clinical and research settings and has been included in more than one 
standardized battery of neuropsychological tests.  Recently, Kessels and colleagues (2000) 
described a standardized version of the test, including instructions, apparatus configuration, 
specific trials, scoring, measures, and normative values.  The design of the PEBL version 
(pCBT) adheres to Kessels’ standardized parameters. 
In the current study, participants were given a standardized set of instructions presented 
on-screen prior to the test.  Once they began the test, blue-colored blocks were displayed on a 
black background, arranged in a static spatial array on the screen.  Blocks were illuminated (i.e. 
changed color from blue to yellow) in a predetermined sequence and participants were 
instructed to reproduce the sequence by clicking on the blocks in the same order they were 
illuminated.  The span of the sequence began with 3 target blocks being illuminated with an 
inter-stimulus interval of 1000ms.  There was a 1000ms interval between trials during which 
participants saw the word “Ready?” in white text centered on a black background.  Two trials of 
each span-length were administered regardless of accuracy on the first trial.  Span lengths 
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ranged from 3 to 9 targets per trial and trials increased by one item as long as the participant 
correctly reproduced one of the two prior trials.  When two trials of a span length were failed, the 
test was discontinued.  The test produced several measures including block span (longest block 
span accurately reproduced at least once), total items correct, and total score, which was 
computed as product of the total number of correct trials and the highest block span correctly 
reproduced at least once.  Since it had the highest variability, pCBT total score was used for 
further analysis as a measure of visual working memory span. 
PEBL Victoria Stroop Color-Word Test  
The Stroop Color-Word Test measures an effect described first by Jaensch (1929), 
which takes advantage of a bottleneck in attention.  When information from the same lexical 
category is presented simultaneously in different modalities (color and print), competition for 
attention creates interference with performance.   There are several standardized versions of 
the Stroop Test widely used in clinical neuropsychological settings (For reviews and 
descriptions of various forms of the Stroop test, see:  Algom, 2004; Cox et al., 2006; Jensen & 
Rohwer, 1966; Stroop, 1935; Troyer et al., 2006b).  Recent research has suggested that 
individuals who reported frequent lucid dreaming were significantly faster on the incongruent 
condition of the Stroop task than were self-reported occasional lucid dreamers or non-lucid 
dreamers (Blagrove et al., 2010).  However, the authors’ findings are considered tentative until 
they can be replicated since observed power was not reported and each group in their study 
had a sample size of only n=15.  Should there be sufficient data to test the hypothesis that 
frequent lucid dreamers perform significantly faster on the incongruent Stroop trial than 
occasional or non-lucid dreamers, this analysis will be performed as part of the exploratory 
analyses of the current study (Exploratory Hypothesis 2).  
In the PEBL version of the Victoria Stroop test (pSTRP), participants used the number 
keys (1, 2, 3, and 4), mapped to the different colors (red, green, yellow, blue) to name each 
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item.  The color-to-key mapping was displayed at the bottom of the screen throughout all trials 
and was randomized across participants (i.e. 1, 2, 3, and 4 were randomly associated with ‘red’, 
‘blue’, ‘yellow’ or ‘green’).  Color to key mapping was consistent, however, within testing 
sessions.  A standardized set of written instructions was displayed prior to the test followed by a 
practice screen designed to familiarize participants with the color-to-key mapping.  The practice 
screen consisted of a black box in the center of the screen and the color-key presented below.  
The black box changed color according to the participant’s key press.  No score was recorded 
during the practice trial.  Learning was assessed qualitatively by having participants look away 
from the screen as they were instructed to press the key for each color.   The practice was 
repeated until the participant could successfully key in each color without looking at the color-
key. 
Once participants felt they had adequately learned the mapping, they began the test.  
There were 3 trials presented in the same order to all participants (‘D’, ‘W’, and ‘C’).  In Trial D, 
participants identified the colors of dots (red, green, yellow, blue).  Trial W involved naming the 
colors of a list of non-color words (“hard”, “when”, “over”, “and”).  In Trial C, color words (“red”, 
“green”, “blue”) were presented in color that was different from the printed word (e.g. the word 
“red” may have been presented in green font).  On all trials, items were presented in a 6 x 4 
rectangular array and evenly distributed spatially.   Participants were asked to key in their 
responses, working sequentially from left to right, as quickly as possible while being careful not 
to make any errors.  The item to be named was enclosed in a gray box which advanced to the 
next item only once it was correctly named (by key press).  If the item was incorrectly named, 
the box flashed, indicating an incorrect response had occurred, and the participant had to try 
again until they made the correct response.  No other feedback was given during test 
administration. 
The test yielded multiple measures including completion time, errors, and total key 
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presses per trial.  Trial C had three additional measures including intrusion scores (trials for 
which the color word was name instead of the word color) and two efficiency scores (Trial C 
time/Trial D time and Trial C time/Trial W time). 
PEBL Subliminally Cued Flicker-Paradigm Test 
The Subliminally Cued Flicker-Paradigm Test v. 0.55 (pCFPT) was designed by Harris 
(2007) for testing the effects of subliminal cues on change blindness.  A series of 45 scenes are 
presented on the screen successively.  Each scene is comprised of two images of the same 
scene (e.g. a busy street) which differ with respect to one element.  Images are presented in an 
alternating fashion every 1 second which creates a flickering effect.  The participant is instructed 
to locate the element which differs between the two, otherwise identical images and press the 
space bar on when they have done so.  An 8 x 6 grid is then presented overlaying the image 
with each coordinate numbered sequentially from left to right, top to bottom.  Participants were 
instructed to type in the number of the coordinate which most closely approximated the location 
of the changing element.  Correct and incorrect responses were recorded as well as response 
latencies.  Trials were either uncued, subliminally cued with the correct location (i.e. a black star 
appeared for <300 ms prior to the image in the location where the change was to occur) or 
subliminally cued in the same way but with the incorrect location.  The test yielded multiple 
measures including total accuracy, response latency per trial, and accuracy on each type of 
cued trial (correctly-cued, falsely-cued, and un-cued).   
Using a less complex form of the cued flicker test, Blagrove and Wilkinson (2010) did not 
find a significant association between ability to spot changes in the images and frequency of 
lucid dreams.  However, the authors admitted that their negative finding may have been due to 
several factors, including the manner by which they characterized lucid dream frequency, the 
coarseness of their measures (i.e. dichotomous scoring on accuracy with scores ranging from 0-
6) or the short length of the test (20s per item, 6 items).  As with their investigation of Stroop 
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task performance and lucid dream frequency, the authors did not report power and had a small 
group sample sizes.  Given their negative findings and the fact that part of our screening 
questions included an item about lucid dream frequency, it seemed worthwhile to conduct 
analyses using this variable to further test Blagrove and Wilkinson’s hypothesis (Exploratory 
Analysis 1). 
The current study used a much longer administration (20s per item, 45 items) with the 
addition of a subliminal cueing factor which will allow us to test whether dream lucidity, prior 
lucid dream frequency, or any other self-report dream measure is associated with change 
blindness.  As part of the exploratory analyses of the current study, the relationship between 
change blindness and lucid dream frequency will be re-evaluated.  Overall accuracy (total 
number of items correct) will be used as the primary measure of change blindness.  Additional 
measures used will include average response latency, and both accuracy and response latency 
on each type of trial (correctly-cued, incorrectly-cued, un-cued). 
PEBL Psychomotor Vigilance Task 
The PEBL version of the Psychomotor Vigilance Task (pPVT) is a simple, high-signal-
load, reaction time test designed to evaluate participants’ ability to sustain attention.  The pPVT 
yields an index of sustained attention (frequency of omissions/lapses), average response time, 
and response time given various inter-stimulus intervals (binned into 1000 ms intervals ranging 
from 1000 to 9000 ms).  The PVT has been used extensively in sleep research and has little to 
no learning curve.  While the PEBL psychomotor vigilance task has not been used extensively 
in research, it is based on has similar administration and timing parameters to the original PVT 
(Dinges & Powell, 1985).  For the current study, average response time on the pPVT was used 
as a measure of sustained attention and false-starts were used as a measure of behavioral 
inhibition. 
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Procedures 
Participants were recruited via print, internet, and in-person solicitation in the local 
community, through the Drexel SONA system which provides extra credit to undergraduate 
students at Drexel University, and from area establishments which offer classes in mindfulness 
meditation (Dhyana Yoga, Studio 34 Yoga, The Zen Center of Philadelphia, and the 
Philadelphia Tibetan Buddhist Center).  Interested participants were screened by phone.   
In order to be eligible for the study, participants were required to be fluent in English, 
aged 18 to 45 years with a stable and normally timed sleep period.  Selection was not 
contingent on race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religious beliefs.  Individuals with a history 
of alcohol or drug abuse, psychiatric illness, neurological insult or syndrome, or any acute or 
chronic, debilitating medical conditions or current medications affecting sleep were excluded 
from the study.   
The study protocol was divided into assessment and dream-reporting phases.  A general 
overview of the study procedure is presented in Figure 1.  Part 1 involved the administration of 
the neuropsychological and mindfulness measures (detailed below).  Part 2 was a week-long 
period during which participants were asked to report their dreams on a daily basis (Part 2) and 
to fill out the DES-2 for each dream they reported.  Dream reports and responses to the DES-2 
were submitted via SurveyMonkey.com.    This study was reviewed and approved by Drexel 
University’s Office of Regulatory Research Compliance. 
Part 1: Neuropsychological and Mindfulness Assessment 
Participants completed the neuropsychological and mindfulness assessments at the 
Department of Psychology’s PSA building at Drexel University.   The neuropsychological test 
battery was administered via PEBL on a laptop PC running Windows 7 (64 bit).  Each test was 
preceded by a standard set of written instructions as detailed above and the experimenter was 
present to ensure adequate understanding of and adherence to the protocol. 
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Part 2: Dream Journaling and DES-2 
After completing the baseline assessment, participants commenced a seven-day dream 
journaling part.  Participants were asked to submit a unique dream report from each night and, 
in order to complete the study, they were required to submit at least one dream reports from 
four separate nights during the 7-day period.  Individuals unable to recall at least four dreams 
were given the option of taking another week to complete the study or were disempanelled if 
they felt they could not complete any more reports.  In addition to the daily dream reporting 
procedure, participants were asked to complete the DES-2 for each dream reported.  
Throughout the protocol, reminders were sent by the investigator via email to request that 
participants fill out their dream diaries and to ensure there were no problems with adhering to 
the general procedures. 
Statistical Analyses 
All analyses were performed using SPSS 19.0© (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, 2010).  Alpha 
levels of .05 and .01 were used depending upon the number of variables and type of statistical 
test used (as described below).  Data normality was inspected both visually and by statistical 
analysis (i.e. normality curve, box and whiskers analysis, measures of skewness and kurtosis) 
to identify outliers.  Genuine outliers (z > 2.0 SD) were excluded from the analysis and, along 
with missing data points, were interpolated using the participant or group mean for the data 
point in question, where appropriate.  All variables were assessed to ensure that none violated 
the specific assumptions of each planned statistical test.  If such a violation occurred, it is 
reported within the results section. 
Sample size  
No prior study has investigated relationships between mindfulness or 
neuropsychological functioning and subjective ratings of dream content.  Thus, an a priori power 
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analyses was performed using G*Power 3.0 (Faul, 2008) using an estimated medium effect size 
for all statistical tests.  Hypothesized relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables in this study were expected to be unidirectional.  Given an alpha of .05, desired power 
of .80, and assuming a medium effect size of .15, a sample size of N = 44 was calculated for 
regression analyses, which was used to test the primary hypotheses of this study. 
Independent Variables 
Variables derived from self-report mindfulness and neuropsychological testing served as 
the independent (predictor) variables used to test this study’s primary hypotheses.  Total scores 
on the MAAS were considered a measure of general mindfulness.  The PHLMS awareness and 
acceptance subscales were considered to measure recent mindful awareness and acceptance.  
Neuropsychological functions were measured by the PEBL test battery.  Sustained attention 
was determined by average response times on the pPVT.  Total score on the pCBT was used to 
measure visual attention span.  The primary measure of change blindness was the total score 
on the pCFPT.  Cognitive set-shifting was measured as the average completion time for pTMT 
B.  There were two measures of behavioral self-monitoring including pSTRP part C completion 
time and total number of false starts on the pPVT. 
Dependent Variables 
Dependent measures were derived from the DES-2.  All DES-2 ratings were evaluated 
for relationships to the independent variables.  Dream lucidity, attention, reflection, self-
awareness, volition, and dream control were measured by their corresponding rating scales on 
the DES-2.  Dream mindfulness was measured as the sum of the attention, reflection, self-
awareness, volition, and control scores.  Since the number of dreams reported during part 2 of 
the study varied between participants, ranging from 4-7 total dreams, average item and 
subscale scores from across all dreams were used to produce one score on each item/subscale 
for each participant.  
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CHAPTER IV:  RESULTS 
The results of this study are presented in the next several sections.  Descriptive statistics 
are presented first.  Following this is a summary of the demographic characteristics of this 
study’s sample along with preliminary analyses evaluating the relationships between these 
demographics, as well as variables collected at screening, and the study’s primary measures.  
The results of each of the study hypotheses are then grouped within their respective aims.   
Descriptives 
Mindfulness measures 
N=47 participants completed the PHLMS and MAAS.  Scores on the MAAS ranged from 
38 to 80, with a mean of 61.57 (SD=8.99).  This was similar to the normative samples for 
community adults or college students (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  PHLMS total and subscale scores 
were similar to the normative sample (Cardaciotto, 2005) with total scores ranging from 37 to 
90, with a mean of 67.65 (SD=8.04).  The awareness subscale scores ranged from 23 to 48, 
with a mean of 38.32 (SD=4.90) and acceptance subscale scores ranged from 14 to 47 with a 
mean of 29.34 (SD=6.57).  Awareness and acceptance subscales on the PHLMS were not 
significantly correlated (p>.05), but total score on the PHLMS demonstrated a high-moderate, 
positive correlation with the awareness subscale, r(46)=.57, p<0.1 and a high correlation with 
the acceptance subscale r(46)=.79, p<.01.  There was a low, positive, but significant correlation 
between scores on the MAAS and the awareness subscale of the PHLMS, r(46)=.24, p=.05.  
The correlation between MAAS scores and PHLMS acceptance subscale scores was not 
significant (p>.05). 
Neuropsychological measures 
N=47 participants completed the neuropsychological test battery.  Descriptive statistics 
are summarized in Tables 2-6.  Noteworthy statistics and test characteristics are described 
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below. 
For the PEBL Trail Making Test, average completion times across all 5 part A and part B 
trials were normally distributed, with no significant outliers.  Results on both tasks were 
consistent with a large sample study of healthy young adults (Piper et al., 2011).  A paired 
samples t-test revealed that the difference between average completion times on parts A and B 
was significant, t(46)=10.30, p<.001. 
On the PEBL Corsi Block Test, memory and block span scores were normally distributed 
and consistent with scores of the standardization sample (Wilde et al., 2004).  Data were 
missing on this task for one participant due to a technical error.  There was one significant 
outlier whose total score, which was the outcome measures used to represent visual attention 
span, was significantly higher than the mean (SD>3.0).  This result was not due to any known 
methodological error, but rather represented an unusually strong performance by this 
participant.  Thus, to be faithful to these observations, this outlier was not removed for 
hypothesis testing.   
Performances on the PEBL Victoria Stroop task were in line with available normative 
values for traditional administration of the Victoria Stroop test for color and word naming 
conditions (Bayard et al., 2011; Charchat-Fichman & Oliveira, 2009; Troyer et al., 2006a) but 
much shorter than has been found with the traditional administration for the incongruent trial of 
this task.  It should be noted that participants in the present study were not required to verbalize 
their responses, which is likely to have contributed to this finding (see Limitations).  Still, scores 
on this task were normally distributed, with no significant outliers.   
No published statistics were available for the PEBL version of the Subliminally Cued 
Flicker Paradigm test and since the testing parameters for similar tasks vary widely in the 
literature, it is difficult to determine whether the present sample’s performances are consistent 
with what would be expected in the general population.  Nonetheless, scores on this task were 
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normally distributed with the exception of accuracy on un-cued trials, which was slightly 
positively skewed.  There were no significant outliers. 
Average response times on the PEBL Psychomotor Vigilance Task were normally 
distributed, with no significant outliers.  This variable was used to represent sustained attention 
ability in the hypothesis tests described below.  False starts (i.e. responding when no stimulus 
was presented) were slightly negatively skewed with two statistical outliers that appeared to be 
due to a failure to instruct these participants to attempt to avoid such errors during the test.  
Thus, these scores were replaced with the group mean (M=4.2) for the purposes of hypothesis 
testing.  Since two variables from this measure were used to represent two presumably 
orthogonal neuropsychological functions, Pearson correlation was used to confirm that they 
were not correlated.  However, results of this analysis demonstrated a low-moderate, positive 
correlation between these variables r(44)=.35, p<.01.  In other words, more frequent false starts 
were associated with longer average response times.  This did not appear to be due to any 
particular feature of the pPVT or to any systematic error in the administration parameters used 
in this study.  Therefore these variables were still considered separately, as planned, in the 
hypothesis tests. 
Dream Experiences Survey 
N=44 participants completed the DES-2 on at least 4/7 days, as required by the protocol, 
which provided an initial sample of 203 dreams.  Data from two participants were deemed 
invalid due to missing item responses (n=1) or dream narratives (n=2).  The resulting sample 
consisted of n=42 participants and a total of 191 dreams for which the DES-2 was fully 
completed.  Descriptive statistics for each item and subscale on the DES-2 are summarized in 
Table 7.  Subscale scores (i.e. Sensory Intensity Subscale, Negative Emotional Intensity 
Subscale, Dream Mindfulness Subscale) were computed for each dream.  Participant’s daily 
ratings were averaged to produce a single score for each item and subscale to be used for 
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testing hypotheses related to specific aims 1 and 2.  Unless otherwise indicated, all items were 
normally distributed. 
Reliability analyses (Chronbach’s alpha coefficient, inter-item correlations, corrected 
item-to-total correlations) were conducted for the DES-2 and the three (sensory intensity, 
negative emotion, and dream mindfulness) subscales.  Overall internal consistency for the DES-
2 was excellent (Chronbach’s alpha = .93) and internal consistency of all three subscales were 
very good (Dream mindfulness subscale, Chronbach’s alpha=.87; Sensory intensity and 
negative emotion subscales, Chronbach’s alpha=.83).  Power was insufficient to meet the 
assumption of non-additivity for these analyses however, so confidence in Chronbach’s alpha is 
low.  Inter-item correlations among the items and subscales comprising the DES-2 ranged from 
.40 to .90.  Of note, dream recall was moderately and positively related to dream mindfulness 
subscale scores, r(42)=.62, p<.01 and ratings of dream attention, r(42)=.61, p<.01 and self-
awareness, r(42)=.62, p<.01.  Overall intensity ratings were also moderately and positively 
related to intensity ratings of anger, r(42)=.62, p<.01, and fear, r(42)=.61, p<.01.  Auditory 
intensity was moderately and positively correlated with sadness, r(42)=.62, p<.01, anger, 
r(42)=.61, p<.01, and confusion, r(42)=.61, p<.01.  Item to total correlation coefficients ranged 
from .59 to .86 for the sensory intensity subscale, from .83 to .89 for the negative emotion 
subscale, and from .70 to .85 for the dream mindfulness subscale.  Item-to-total correlations 
(item ratings to total DES-2 score) were not computed since the DES-2 total score was not used 
in any of the analyses. 
Lucid Dreams 
Across the 7-day dream-reporting phase of the study, n=209 reports answered the 
question “How close were you to realizing you were dreaming during this dream?” A total of16 
reports (7.6%) from 11 participants (n=5 female) contained rating of ‘5’ on this item, indicating 
the participant had realized he or she was dreaming during the dream (i.e. lucid dreams).  
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These dreams were selected for further analyses.  On closer inspection of these narratives, it 
was revealed that only 3 (1.4%) made any mention of the dreamer being aware that he or she 
was dreaming during the dream. 
Demographics 
Demographic variables relevant to the measures used in this study were collected for 
N=47 participants.  Average typical bed time (prior to the study) was 2145h (SD=3.9h) and 
average typical wake time was 0730h (SD=2.5h).  Typical number of dreams per night prior to 
the study ranged from 0 to 4 (M=1.46, SD=.70).  Typical amount of dream detail recalled from 
dreams was scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘none’ to ‘all or nearly all the detail’.  
Of the full sample 25.6% said they could recall that they had dreamt, but could not recall the 
details of their dream;10.6% said they could recall ‘bits and pieces’ from their dreams, 21.3% 
reported being able to recall ‘some of the detail’, 31.9% reported being able to recall ‘most of the 
detail’, and 10.6% reported being able to recall ‘nearly all of the detail’ from their dreams.  Prior 
knowledge of lucid dreaming was reported by 36.2% of participants.  Frequency of lucid 
dreaming ranged from ‘never’ to ‘more than once per month’.  The breakdown of lucid dream 
frequency prior  to the study was 42.6% ‘never’, 31.9% ‘at least once’, 8.5% ‘at least once per 
month’, and 2.1% ‘more than once per month’.  Nightmare frequency was assessed by a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from ‘never’ to ‘all the time’.  It was found that 21.3% of participants 
reported experiencing nightmares ‘rarely’ or ‘never’, 40.4% reported having nightmares 
‘sometimes’, 17% reported frequent nightmares, and 6.4% reported having nightmares ‘all the 
time’.  Regular video game use (>1h per week) was reported by 25.5% of participants, of which 
only one participant played immersive, first-person games for >1h per week.  Daily caffeine use 
was reported by 51.1% of participants.5  Current or recent meditation practice was scored on a 
                                                             
5 If individuals reported regular caffeine use, they were asked not to use caffeine in the evenings during phase 2 of 
the study. 
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yes/no basis.  55.3% of participants reporting no regular meditation practice and 19.1% 
reporting at least moderate practice (< once per week). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to evaluate relationships among all variables 
assessed at screening and the primary variables of interest in this study.  Relationships 
between demographic variables and all other study measures were evaluated using Pearson 
correlations and an alpha of .05 (one-tailed).  Age was moderately and positively correlated with 
pTMT A performance, with younger participants demonstrating faster average completion times, 
r(45)=.43, p<.01.  A significant positive correlation was found between pTMT B and age as well.  
Younger participants demonstrated faster minimum completion times r(45)=.33, p=.03.  On the 
pSTRP task, color naming speed demonstrated a low-moderate and positively correlation with 
age r(45)=.29, p<.05, with younger participants demonstrating faster completion times.  Word 
reading speed was also positively correlated with age r(45)=.33, p=.03 in the low-moderate 
range with younger ages again demonstrating faster completion times.   Age was negatively 
correlated with pPVT average reaction time r(37)=.33, p<.05, false starts, r(44)=-.30, p<.05, and 
lapses, r(46)=-.31, p=.04, all in the low-moderate range, with older participants performing 
comparatively worse on these measures.  For the pCFPT, a significant, low-moderate, positive 
correlation was found between age and accuracy on correctly cued trials r(45)=.30, p=.04, such 
that older participants performed better than younger participants. 
Differences in performance based on sex were evaluated using student’s t-tests and 
alpha levels were set at .05 (two-tailed).  Males had a significantly greater number of correct 
trials on the pCBT (M=9.10, SD=1.89) compared to females (M=8.00, SD=1.52), t(43)=2.16, 
p=.04.  This difference was also significant with respect to block span, with males demonstrating 
longer spans (M=6.50, SD=1.43) than females (M=5.65, SD=1.16), t(36.12)=2.15, p=.04.   
Females had a significantly more correct trials (M=12.85, SD=1.54) relative to males (M=11.15, 
SD=2.20) on un-cued trials of the pCFPT, t(45)=-3.12, p<.01.  Females also had significantly 
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faster response times (M=13.72s, SD=4.54s) relative to males (M=16.54s, SD=3.44s), t(45)=-
3.01, p<.01 on falsely-cued trials of the pCFPT.  Males had faster average reaction times 
(M=294.72ms, SD=31.69ms) compared to females (M=327.05ms, SD=40.24ms) on the pPVT, 
t(37)=-2.63, p=.01. 
Participants with visual problems were significantly slower on the pTMT A (M=16.43s, 
SD=4.60s) compared to those without known visual problems (M=13.16s, SD=3.77s), t(40)=-
2.45, p=.02.6  Those who reported using caffeine had significantly slower average completion 
times on pTMT A (M=20.51s, SD=3.41s) compared with those who did not (M=17.92s, 
SD=2.88s), t(32)=-2.54, p=.02.  Caffeine users also had slower minimum completion times on 
the pTMT B (M=21.90s, SD=5.10s) relative to those who did not regularly use caffeine 
(M=18.07s, SD=3.46s), t(39)=-2.68, p=.01. 
Typical nightmare frequency was low-moderately correlated with scores on the PHLMS 
awareness subscale, r(40)=.36, p=.02, with higher nightmare frequency associated with higher 
PHLMS awareness scores.  It is important to note that the PHLMS acceptance subscale was 
not correlated with typical nightmare frequency, but was weakly correlated with the number of 
nightmares had during the study, r(42)=.27, p=.04. No other significant correlations were found 
between scores on the MAAS or PHLMS and any other demographic variables (all p>0.05). 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Specific Aim 1 
Primary Hypotheses 
Specific Aim 1 was to investigate whether higher levels of mindfulness skills in waking 
were related to higher levels of dream lucidity and dream mindfulness.  Linear regression was 
used to test the hypothesis that higher levels of waking mindfulness would account for a 
                                                             
6  All participants who reported visual acuity problems wore either glasses or contact lenses during the 
administration of the neuropsychological measures. 
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significant amount of the variance in ratings of dream lucidity (Hypotheses 1a) and dream 
mindfulness (Hypothesis 1b).  All mindfulness measures were entered into the regression 
model for both analyses. 
Results indicated that the three waking mindfulness measures did not explain a 
significant amount of the variance in dream lucidity ratings, R2=.08, F(3,41)=.09, p=.97.  The 
three waking mindfulness measures did, however, explain a significant amount of the variance 
(20%) in average dream mindfulness, R2=.20, F(3,41)=3.10, p=.04, with recent mindful 
awareness (PHLMS awareness subscale) demonstrating a moderate and positive correlation 
with dream mindfulness, =.40, t(41)=2.72, p=.01 (See Figure 1).   
Pearson correlation was used to assess the relationship between dream lucidity and 
dream mindfulness.  Results revealed a weak, marginally significant, but positive correlation 
between dream lucidity and dream mindfulness, r(41)=.22, p=.08 (Hypothesis 1c). 
To further investigate whether waking mindfulness was associated with the components 
of the dream mindfulness subscale, Pearson correlations were used to test the direction and 
degree of association between waking mindfulness measures and average ratings of dream 
attention, reflection, self-awareness, volition, and control (Hypothesis 1d).  Results are 
summarized in Table 8.  Of note, general mindfulness was weakly and positively associated 
with dream attention, r(41)=.29, p=.03, but not with dream reflection, self-awareness, volition, or 
control (all p>.05).  There were low-moderate to moderate positive correlations between recent 
mindful awareness and dream attention, r(41)=.39, p<.01, reflection r(41)=.39, p<.01, self-
awareness, r(41)=.32, p=.02, and volition, r(41)=.37, p<.01.  The correlation between recent 
mindful awareness and dream control was only marginally significant, but in the predicted 
direction r(41)=.24, p=.07.  The correlation between recent mindful acceptance and dream 
attention was also marginally significant, again in the predicted direction r(41)=-.23, p=.08.  
Recent mindful acceptance was not significantly correlated with dream reflection, self-
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awareness, volition, or control (all p>.05).  
Ancillary Hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that levels of recent mindful acceptance would be associated with 
negative emotional intensity in dreams (Hypothesis 1e).  This hypothesis was also tested using 
Pearson correlation.  It should be noted here that higher levels of recent mindful acceptance are 
indicated by lower scores on the PHLMS acceptance subscale.  Higher levels of recent mindful 
acceptance were moderately correlated with lower ratings of negative emotional intensity in 
dreams, r(37)=.41, p<.01 as well as lower ratings of specific negative emotions including anger, 
r(37)=.36, p=.01, fear r(37)=.35, p=.01, and sadness, r(37)=.33, p=.02.  Recent mindful 
acceptance was not significantly correlated with ratings of dream happiness (p>.05) and, while 
recent mindful acceptance was not correlated with typical nightmare frequency, it  was weakly 
and positively correlated with the number of nightmares had during the study, r(42)=.27, p=.04. 
General mindfulness and recent mindful awareness were predicted to be positively 
associated with sensory intensity in dreams (Hypothesis 1f).  Relationships between waking 
mindfulness measures and ratings of dream sensory intensity were evaluated using Pearson 
correlations.  Recent mindful awareness was weakly and positively associated with ratings of 
tactile intensity r(42)=.26, p=.05 and marginally, but positively correlated with ratings of 
gustatory/olfactory intensity r(42)=.24, p=.06, vestibular intensity, r(42)=.21, p=.09, and overall 
sensory intensity r(42)=.22, p=.08.   All other relationships between general mindfulness and 
recent mindful awareness and ratings of sensory intensity in dreams were non-significant 
(p>.05).  
Recent mindful acceptance was weakly and positively associated with sensory intensity 
in dreams, r(42)=.27, p=.04 .  Recent mindful acceptance demonstrated a high-moderate 
association with ratings of auditory intensity in dreams, r(42)=.57, p<.01.  All other relationships 
between recent mindful acceptance and dream sensory intensity ratings were non-significant 
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(p>.05). 
Summary 
Overall, there was mixed support for Hypotheses 1a-1d.  Higher levels of waking 
mindfulness did not account for a significant amount of the variance in dream lucidity and tests 
for relationships between waking mindfulness and dream lucidity were not statistically 
significant.  However, recent mindful awareness did account for a significant amount of the 
variance in dream mindfulness.  A weak, positive correlation was found between general 
mindfulness and dream attention.  Positive correlations ranging from low-moderate to moderate 
were found between recent mindful awareness and dream attention, reflection, self-awareness, 
and volition.  Recent mindful awareness also demonstrated a marginally significant but positive 
correlation with dream control.   Recent mindful acceptance  showed marginal but positive 
correlation with dream attention.  The relationship between dream mindfulness and dream 
lucidity was marginally significant in the predicted direction. 
The hypothesis that levels of self-reported waking mindfulness would explain a 
significant amount of the variance in self-ratings of dream lucidity (Hypothesis 1a) was not 
supported.  As predicted however, higher levels of waking mindfulness skills did explain a 
significant amount of variance in ratings of dream mindfulness (Hypothesis 1b), with recent 
mindful awareness demonstrating a significant correlation with dream mindfulness.  Consistent 
with Hypothesis 1c, higher ratings of lucidity were marginally and positively associated with 
higher levels of dream mindfulness.  With regard to Hypothesis 1d, there was a positive 
association between general levels of mindfulness and dream attention as predicted, but not 
dream reflection, self-awareness, volition, or control.   
The present results fully support Hypotheses 1e, with recent mindful acceptance 
moderately correlated with negative emotional intensity in dreams, as well as with specific 
negative emotions including anger, fear, and sadness, all in the predicted direction.  Happiness 
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was not associated with acceptance.   
Higher levels of general and recent mindful awareness were predicted to be significantly 
associated with higher levels sensory intensity (Hypothesis 1f).  Contrary to this hypothesis, 
higher levels of recent mindful acceptance, but not recent mindful awareness, were significantly 
associated with higher levels sensory intensity.  The strongest association between waking 
acceptance and any of the dream variables was auditory intensity. 
Specific Aim 2 
Specific Aim 2 was to investigate whether neuropsychological measures of sustained 
attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and cognitive set 
shifting were related to dream lucidity, dream mindfulness, or the components of the dream 
mindfulness subscale (attention, reflection, self-awareness, volition, or control).  All relationships 
were evaluated using Pearson correlation with the exception of a partial correlation, controlling 
for sex, which was used to evaluate the relationship between visual attention span and dream 
ratings.  All tests were one-tailed (alpha=.05).   
None of the neuropsychological variables demonstrated statistically significant 
associations with dream lucidity or dream mindfulness (all p>.05).  There was a statistical trend 
for better performance on a measure of behavioral self-monitoring (fewer false starts on the 
pPVT) to be associated with higher levels of dream mindfulness, r(40)=.26, p=.05.  Sustained 
attention was moderately and negatively correlated with ratings of dream self-awareness, 
r(40)=-.40, p<.01, in the predicted direction such that faster average response times were 
related to higher ratings of dream self-awareness.  Sustained attention was also marginally 
correlated with ratings of dream volition, r(40)=-.25, p=.07 and attention, r(40)=-.25, p=.08.  Both 
were also in the predicted direction.  Visual attention span was not associated any of the dream 
ratings when controlling for sex (all p>.05).  Correlations between change detection and dream 
attention, reflection, self-awareness, volition, and dream control were not statistically significant 
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(all p>.05).  Behavioral self-monitoring (false starts on the pPVT) was moderately and negatively 
correlated with dream reflection r(40)=-.43, p<.01 and weakly and negatively associated with 
ratings of dream self-awareness, r(40)=-.25, p=.05.  The correlation between behavioral self-
monitoring (false starts on the pPVT) and ratings of dream attention was marginally significant in 
the predicted direction r(40)=-.23, p=.07.  In other words, higher numbers of false starts were 
related to lower ratings of these dream variables.  There was also a marginally significant, 
positive correlation between cognitive set shifting and ratings of dream control, r(41)=.24, p=.07.   
Overall, there was mixed support for Hypotheses 2.  The hypothesis that better 
performance on measures of a range of neuropsychological functions would be associated with 
greater dream lucidity was not fully supported.  However, better performances on measures of 
sustained attention and behavioral self-monitoring were moderately associated with higher 
ratings of dream self-awareness.  Sustained attention also demonstrated marginally significant 
correlations with ratings of volition and attention.  Behavioral self-monitoring (pPVT false starts) 
demonstrated was moderately associated with dream reflection and weakly associated with 
dream mindfulness, self-awareness, and attention.  There was also a non-significant trend for 
better performance on a measure of cognitive set shifting to be related to higher ratings of 
dream control.   
Summary 
It was hypothesized that better performance on a variety of neuropsychological 
measures tapping sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change 
detection, and cognitive set shifting would correlate with higher participant ratings of dream 
lucidity and dream mindfulness (Hypothesis 2).  Contrary to this hypothesis, waking 
neuropsychological performances were not significantly correlated with lucidity or dream 
mindfulness.   
When measures of sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, 
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change detection, and cognitive set shifting were evaluated with respect to dream cognitive 
functions though, several relationships were revealed.  Sustained attention was moderately 
associated with higher ratings of dream self-awareness, while behavioral self-monitoring (pPVT 
false starts) was moderately associated with dream reflection and weakly associated with dream 
mindfulness, dream self-awareness and dream attention.  There were also statistical trends for 
relationships between better performance on a measure of sustained attention and higher 
ratings of volition and attention and for better performance on a measure of cognitive set shifting 
and higher ratings of dream control. 
Specific Aim 3 
Specific Aim 3 was to investigate whether better performance on neuropsychological 
measures sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change 
detection, and cognitive set shifting are related to higher levels of self-reported waking 
mindfulness.  Relationships between self-reported waking mindfulness skills and sustained 
attention, change detection, behavioral self-monitoring, and cognitive set shifting were assessed 
using Pearson correlation.  Partial correlation, controlling for sex, was used to evaluate the 
relationship between mindfulness skills and visual attention span.  All relationships were 
analyzed using one–tailed tests and an alpha of .05. 
Levels of general mindfulness were moderately and negatively associated with average 
response times on a measure of sustained attention, r(38)=-.30, p=.03 and moderately and 
negatively associated with behavioral self-monitoring as well, r(38)=-.38, p<.01.  Recent mindful 
awareness demonstrated a low-moderate, negative correlation with response latencies on a 
measure of change detection, r(40)=-.31, p=.03.  Levels of recent mindful acceptance were 
weakly and positively associated with a measure of sustained attention, r(38)=.27, p=.05 and 
moderately and positively correlated with behavioral self-monitoring r(44)=.41., p<.01.  Recent 
mindful acceptance scores were also weakly and negatively correlated with efficiency scores on 
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the Stroop task, r(45)=-.26, p=.04..  There were no other significant correlations between 
neuropsychological measures and self-reported levels of general mindfulness or recent mindful 
awareness or acceptance.   
Summary 
There was mixed support for Hypothesis 3.  Higher levels of general mindfulness skills 
and recent mindful acceptance were associated with better performance on measures of 
sustained attention and behavioral monitoring.  Levels of recent mindful acceptance were also 
weakly associated with efficiency on the pSTRP task.  It was expected that higher levels of self-
reported waking mindfulness skills would be associated with better performances on these 
same neuropsychological measures.  As expected, better MAAS performance was related to 
better performance on a measure of sustained attention.  However, recent mindfulness 
awareness was not associated with sustained attention.  Higher levels of recent mindful 
acceptance were also associated with better performances on measures of sustained attention, 
behavioral self-monitoring, and better efficiency on the Stroop C task.  There were no other 
significant correlations between neuropsychological measures and self-reported waking 
mindfulness skills.  Contrary to predictions, none of the self-report mindfulness measures were 
significantly correlated with cognitive set shifting or visual attention span.  
Chapter Summary 
To summarize, self-reported general self-reported waking mindfulness skills (MAAS), 
mindful awareness and acceptance (PHLMS) skills, and neuropsychological measures of 
sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and 
cognitive set shifting were not significantly associated with ratings of dream lucidity (DES-2).  
Greater waking mindful awareness (PHLMS awareness) was, however, associated with higher 
average dream mindfulness, and attention, reflection, volition and self-awareness.  Better 
performance on measures of sustained attention and behavioral self-monitoring were correlated 
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with higher average ratings of dream self-awareness.  There were also statistical trends for 
better performances on sustained attention to be related to higher ratings of volition and 
attention as well.  Finally, there was a non-significant trend for better performance on a measure 
of cognitive set shifting to be related to higher ratings of dream control.  Finally, higher levels of 
general mindfulness skills and recent mindful acceptance were associated with better 
performances on measures of sustained attention and behavioral monitoring. 
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CHAPTER V:  DISCUSSION 
In the next several sections, the theoretical implications of the results will be addressed 
with regard to both the specific aims and hypotheses as set forth in the introduction and existing 
theoretical models of dreaming and mindfulness.  A separate section is dedicated to a 
discussion of the degree to which the present results support continuity theory and a proposal is 
made for the expansion of this theory to account for the findings that waking cognitive and 
psychological processes may be continuous between waking and dreaming.  Following this 
discussion, the limitations of the present study will be reviewed followed by a brief conclusion. 
The overarching aim of this study was to investigate whether mindfulness in waking was 
related to lucidity in dreams.  To address this aim, a correlational design was used – assessing 
the relationships between levels of waking mindfulness, performances on measures of 
neuropsychological functions with presumed relationships to mindfulness, and self-ratings of 
dream lucidity as well as dream sensory, emotional, and cognitive variables.  The specific aims 
were to investigate the degree of association between: 1) Levels of self-reported mindfulness in 
waking and levels of dream lucidity, dream cognitive function, and dream sensory and emotional 
intensity; 2) Performance on neuropsychological measures (sustained attention, visual attention 
span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and cognitive set shifting) and the 
aforementioned dream variables; and 3) Performance on these aforementioned 
neuropsychological measures and self-reported mindfulness in waking.   
Theoretical Implications 
Relationships between waking mindfulness and dreaming 
This study did not find support for the hypothesis that waking mindfulness is related to 
dream lucidity (Hypothesis 1a), and thus the null hypothesis cannot be rejected given the 
present results.  While it is possible that mindfulness and lucidity are truly unrelated, an 
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alternative interpretation is that there were not enough lucid dreams in this study to adequately 
characterize the relationship between mindfulness and lucidity (i.e. a type II error).   
Yet another interpretation is that lucidity is not best characterized as a continuum.  While 
lucid and non-lucid dreams clearly differ on several cognitive and psychological variables 
(Kahan & LaBerge, 2011; Rider et al., 2012), characterizing lucidity on a continuum (or as 
anything other than an awareness of the fact that one is dreaming), raises the very difficult 
problem of identifying and operationalizing aspects of lucid dream consciousness which are 
necessarily associated with it.   
The difficulty with identifying the appropriate terminology to operationalize lucidity has 
been encountered and addressed extensively in the literature (Barrett, 1992; Kahan, 1994; 
Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & Laberge, 1994b; Kahan & LaBerge, 2011; LaBerge et al., 1995; 
Purcell et al., 1986; Voss et al., 2009).  Barrett (1992), for example, described four "corollaries" 
of lucidity including: 1) knowledge that one is dreaming; 2) knowledge that objects will disappear 
after waking; 3) knowledge that physical laws are not applicable; and 4) memory of the waking 
world is intact.  However, in the 50 individuals whose dreams she examined, less than a quarter 
of those which were deemed “lucid” by the dreamer contained evidence of all four of these 
corollaries.  Other researchers have experimented with different terms to describe awareness in 
lucid dreams, classifying them as a “hybrid state” of consciousness (Voss et al., 2009) or 
referring to the lucidity as the high-end of a continuum of “dream self-reflectiveness” (Kahan, 
1994; Moffit, 1991; Purcell, 1987; Purcell et al., 1986).  Still others have applied modifiers such 
as ‘lucid control dreams’ (Gackenbach, 2009) and ‘high lucidity’ (Ogilvie et al., 1983) to 
differentiate the realization of dreaming from the nature of the dreamer’s awareness and 
volitional faculty during the ensuing dreamed experience.  Even after many decades of dream 
research, the problem of characterizing consciousness in dreams, and even more so in lucid 
dreams, is far from resolved.  In fact, in a recent article by Kahan and LaBerge (2011), the 
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authors present a list of over 15 constructs that have been used to describe the nature of 
conscious awareness in lucid dreams.     
  In an attempt to address the incompatibility of the term ‘lucidity’ with the aspects of 
consciousness often associated with lucidity in the literature, an alternative construct referred to 
as ‘dream mindfulness’ was derived.  Dream mindfulness was operationalized as concurrently 
high ratings of dream attention, reflection, self-awareness, volition, and control.  The rationale 
for using this term, as opposed to ‘lucidity’ was that, while lucidity may often include high levels 
of these cognitive functions, they may not necessarily be present in all lucid dreams and, 
conversely, may be present in some non-lucid dreams.   
As is implied by the term, dream mindfulness was purported here to be more akin to 
waking mindfulness than lucidity.  It was therefore hypothesized that higher levels of waking 
mindfulness skills would explain a significant amount of variance in ratings of dream 
mindfulness.  Indeed, the three waking mindfulness measures together explained a significant 
amount of the variance in dream mindfulness and recent levels of mindful awareness were 
moderately and positively correlated with levels of dream mindfulness.  That this pattern of 
relationships was largely consistent with the pattern expected of the lucidity scale supports the 
notion that, while higher levels of cognitive function may be associated with lucid dreaming, they 
are not necessarily exclusive to lucid dreams.   
The trend for higher ratings of lucidity to be associated with higher levels of dream 
mindfulness, though tenuous, does provide some additional support for the claim that higher 
levels of cognitive function, while associated with lucid dreaming, are not necessarily exclusive 
to lucid dreaming.  It seems appropriate at this point to acknowledge the large body of research 
which has already demonstrated that dream cognition is not as different from waking cognition 
as is typically thought (See, for example: Cartwright, 1981; Gackenbach & LaBerge, 1988; Hunt 
& Ogilvie, 1989; Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & Laberge, 1994b; Kahan & LaBerge, 2011; 
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LaBerge et al., 1995; Maggiolini et al., 2010; Schredl, 1998).  It has been demonstrated that 
even non-lucid dreams contain some degree of attentional control, reflection on the events of 
the dream, awareness of one’s own thoughts, feelings, appearance, and behavior, 
intentional/volitional activity and choice (Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & LaBerge, 2011).  
Consistent with anecdotal reports, recent research has shown that lucid dreams do, in fact, 
contain more frequent incidence of these functions (Rider et al., 2012).   
The MAAS, used to measure “general mindfulness”, which was only associated with 
dream attention, assesses the present-moment attention and awareness component of 
mindfulness.  The authors of the measure explicitly state that items containing attitudinal 
components, such as acceptance, were excluded (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  Recent mindful 
awareness, as measured by the PHLMS awareness subscale, which attempts to measure 
awareness of thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, was associated with dream mindfulness and 
nearly all of its subcomponents.  The PHLMS awareness subscale thus appeared to better 
capture the type of waking mindfulness skills that are continuous with dream mindfulness as 
conceptualized in the present study. 
However, that dream attention, reflection, self-awareness, volition, and control might be 
collectively considered as a construct separate from lucidity (i.e. dream mindfulness) and that 
this construct is correlated with waking mindfulness is a novel finding which has implications for 
the continuity theory of dreams (discussed in detail below).  The correlation between recent 
mindful acceptance and dream attention was marginally significant, a finding which is less 
straightforward to interpret.  While psychological acceptance may not be directly related to 
attentional control in dreams, it seems possible that it could moderate the relationship between 
recent waking mindful awareness and dream attentional control. 
Participants who tended to be less accepting and more labeling and judgmental of their 
waking experiences also tended to report more intense feelings of anger, fear, and sadness in 
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their dreams.  This set of results is novel, but consistent with a large number of studies which 
investigated the relationship between waking and dreaming emotions in a different manner.  
Specifically,  previous studies have demonstrated that psychological stress and/or negative 
mood in waking is typically associated with more negative emotions in dreams and a higher 
incidence of nightmares (For a review, see Levin & Nielsen, 2007).  This has been purported by 
some to be related to the “replay” of important emotional experiences for the purposes of 
psychological growth (Hobson & Schredl, 2011), to the processing of emotional memories 
(Bednar, 2000; Cartwright et al., 1998; Dolcos et al., 2004, 2005; Walker & van der Helm, 2009), 
or to a role for REM sleep in brain plasticity (Fosse et al., 2001; Hobson & Schredl, 2011). 
Of course, the finding that higher levels of waking mindful acceptance were related to 
lower intensity of negative emotions in dreams may simply reflect the nonjudgmental nature of 
individuals with higher levels of acceptance.  That is, perhaps participants with higher levels of 
psychological acceptance were simply judging their emotional experiences in both waking and 
dreaming as being less intense. 
A more speculative interpretation is also worthy of mention given the large body of 
evidence which now strongly suggests that REM sleep plays an important role in emotional 
memory processing (Bednar, 2000; Cartwright et al., 1998; Dolcos et al., 2004, 2005; Walker & 
van der Helm, 2009).  Based on the results of this study, it appears plausible that the 
relationship between waking mindful acceptance and negative emotional intensity in dreams 
may reflect a socially beneficial, adaptive function of dreaming.  Possibly, negative emotional 
experiences which are not processed in a psychologically accepting manner during waking are 
more intensely expressed in dream content in order to reduce their valence and allow for the 
consolidation of the informational component of the memory which, when retrieved, will not also 
activate its initially associated emotional response.  The proposed mechanism for such a 
process would involve a decoupling of the declarative, emotionally neutral aspects of some 
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memory representation from the emotionally salient aspects. 
Another interpretation is that these results demonstrate continuity between the mode of 
emotional processing across waking and dreaming.  This is consistent with work by Schredl and 
colleagues in the past decade which has demonstrated that emotional salience is an important 
factor affecting the incorporation of waking experiences into dream content (Schredl, 2000), but 
implies that psychological acceptance is another important factor which might affect the rate of 
incorporation of waking emotional concerns.  
Contrary to the hypothesis that higher levels of waking mindfulness would be related to 
higher levels of sensory intensity in dreams, only recent mindful acceptance, but not recent 
mindful awareness, was significantly associated with higher levels sensory intensity in dreams.  
Interestingly, waking acceptance demonstrated the strongest association auditory intensity.  
While this was not expected, it appears that the most likely interpretation of these results is that 
the PHLMS does, in fact, tap perceptual awareness and that the capacity for this sort of 
perceptual awareness in dreams is proportional to that in waking – particularly with respect to 
auditory awareness.  A different and more speculative interpretation, when considered in light of 
the relationships between waking acceptance and negative emotional intensity, there may be an 
interaction between negative dream content, auditory content, and waking levels of emotional 
acceptance.  Finally, recalling the relationships between the default mode network and 
mindfulness practice stated above, it appears plausible that the auditory intensity item reflects, 
to some degree, dialogue in dreams.  This relationship could then represent a continuation of 
waking self-talk. 
Relationships between neuropsychological functioning and dreaming 
The finding that sustained attention performance was only marginally associated with 
dream attention is somewhat inconsistent with the result demonstrating a significant relationship 
between recent mindful awareness and dream attention.  This may be the result of two aspects 
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of REM sleep neuropsychological functioning.  The first factor is the reduced capability of the 
brain to activate regions important for sustained attention during REM sleep.  Due to the 
particular balance of the neurochemical milieu in REM sleep, that is, a prevalence of 
acetylcholine coupled with a reduction of noradrenaline and serotonin relative to waking, there is 
a relative deactivation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate gyrus, precuneus, 
and inferior parietal cortex (Braun et al., 1997; Maquet, 2000; Maquet & Phillips, 1998; Maquet 
et al., 2005; Maquet, Peters, Aerts, Delfiore, et al., 1996; Nofzinger et al., 1997).  The second 
factor is that the PHLMS intends to tap perceptual awareness, which may not necessarily be 
diminished during dreaming as has been postulated by Hobson and colleagues (Hobson & 
Pace-Schott, 2002).   
The pattern of correlations between false starts on the pPVT and dream variables 
suggests that those with better performance on this measure demonstrated slightly higher levels 
of mindfulness, self-awareness, and attention and moderately higher levels of reflection.  One 
explanation for these findings which appears plausible within the continuity theory of dreaming 
is that those who committed a greater number of false start errors on the pPVT may have done 
so in an attempt to correct for inattentiveness, as suggested by the finding that false-starts and 
average response times were moderately and positively correlated.  Possibly, such 
inattentiveness may have been related to mind-wandering/daydreaming.  This finding might 
then be consistent with Domhoff’s proposal that continuity between waking and dreaming is 
neurologically based in the default mode network.  That is, if a greater number of false starts on 
this measure indicate more mind-wandering, this might be reflected in dream content as a less 
mindful dreamer who is particularly less likely to engage in reflection on the events of his or her 
dreams, less capable of controlling his or her attention in dreams, and less self-aware during 
dreaming.  However, this hypothesis is admittedly speculative and could not be adequately 
tested with the design of this study.  As such, further research is necessary to clarify these 
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results 
Relationships between self-reported mindfulness and neuropsychological functioning 
This study employed two measures of mindfulness, one which tapped general levels of 
mindful attention and awareness (MAAS) and another which intended to measure recent (within 
the week preceding the study) levels of mindful awareness and acceptance (PHLMS).  Thus, it 
was possible to investigate the relationship between general levels of mindful attention, recent 
levels of mindful awareness and acceptance, and performance on neuropsychlogical measures 
of sustained attention, visual attention span, behavioral self-monitoring, change detection, and 
cognitive set shifting. 
It appears likely that the differences in the manner by which each the MAAS and PHLMS 
measured ‘awareness’ best explains the particular pattern of observed results.  Specifically, the 
awareness subscale of the PHLMS includes a variety of questions that focus on awareness of 
thoughts, emotions, and perceptions  (Cardaciotto, 2005).  The MAAS, on the other hand, 
contains a large number of items which appear to tap into problems of attention/inattentiveness, 
such as frequency of attentional lapses, problems focusing or concentrating, and forgetfulness 
in everyday life (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  This interpretation is further supported by this study’s 
finding that higher levels of recent mindful awareness (PHLMS awareness subscale) were 
associated with faster response times on a measure of change detection – a test which is 
particularly sensitive to visual perceptual function – while general mindfulness (MAAS) was 
associated only with performance on a measure of sustained attention. 
Interestingly, higher levels of recent mindful acceptance were also associated with better 
performance on measures of sustained attention and behavioral self-monitoring (both pPVT 
false starts and pSTRP efficiency).  This, again, appears somewhat contradictory given the lack 
of a significant relationship between these measures and recent mindful awareness.  It has 
been suggested that individuals with high levels of arousal do not necessarily perform better on 
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tasks requiring attentional control, particularly in cases of anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
Though the correlational design can only allow us to conclude the direction and strength of this 
relationship, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that acceptance could moderate the effect of 
attentional variability on attentional performance by reducing distractibility (see ‘Future 
Directions’).   
Implications for the Continuity Theory of Dreams 
A significant amount of work suggests that recent waking experiences are frequently 
incorporated into the content of dreams. Several factors have been shown to influence the rate 
of incorporation including emotional valence, personality, type of experience, and temporal 
proximity to the dream in question (Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003).  While there is 
ample evidence to support continuity theory with respect to thematic content (Collerton & Perry, 
1995; Gackenbach et al., 2011; King & DeCicco, 2009; Maggiolini et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 
2004; Noreika, 2011; Pesant & Zadra, 2006; Roussy et al., 1996; Samson & Dekoninck, 1986; 
Schredl, 2000; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003; Schredl et al., 1998), several researchers have 
recently called into question the completeness of the theory (Hobson & Schredl, 2011).  The 
important difference between these prior studies and the finding that mindful awareness and 
dream mindfulness are related is that the former focus on the structural features of dreams (i.e. 
thematic content) while this study looked for relationships between psychological and cognitive 
processes across the two states.   
Continuity in cognitive processes has not been widely reported across sleep and wake, 
though it has been hypothesized based on the continuity of thematic content and personality 
variables.  To date, only a small number of studies have investigated relationships between 
waking and dreaming perceptual (DeKoninck et al., 1996) and cognitive processes (Blagrove et 
al., 2010; Blagrove & Wilkinson, 2010; Kahan et al., 1997; Kahan & LaBerge, 2011).  Thus, a 
central issue in the present study is the question of whether, in addition to the incorporation of 
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content, waking levels of perceptual and cognitive functions are continuous with dream 
perceptual and cognitive function.  It was this study’s aim to explore the relationships between 
waking mindfulness and related neuropsychological functions, and ratings of dream cognitive, 
emotional, and sensory experiences.  As such, the findings of this study are uniquely suited to 
addressing, and possibly expanding, the continuity theory of dreaming. 
The results of this study suggest that dream lucidity was not related to any waking 
mindfulness or neuropsychological variables.  That lucidity was not related to waking 
mindfulness is surprising, especially given the similarity of the two constructs (Stumbrys, 2011).  
However, if the null hypothesis is correct, then would seem that these two constructs are not 
continuous.  This study’s failure to find a relationship between lucidity and mindfulness may be 
because the cognitive functions necessary for dream lucidity are different from those which are 
associated with mindfulness.   
An alternative explanation pertains to the manner in which dream lucidity and waking 
mindfulness were measured in the present study.  Unfortunately, this study did not measure the 
conceptual equivalent of lucidity in waking.  That is, participants were not asked how close they 
were to realizing they were awake during wakefulness, nor were they asked about how 
frequently during waking they performed reality tests of the sort which might be associated with 
lucid dream induction.  Thus it was not possible to make a direct comparison of dreaming and 
waking ratings of lucidity.  This difference in waking and dreaming constructs was intended, as 
the primary constructs of interest were waking mindfulness and dream lucidity, not reality 
testing.   
Some have suggested that lucidity is better conceptualized as a continuum of 
awareness (Moss, 1986; Stumbrys, 2011).  However, a “lucidity” continuum may confound what 
is a set of cognitive processes associated with lucidity and the testing of reality or even the 
spontaneous realization that that one is dreaming.  Whether the realization that one is dreaming 
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comes about due to the recognition that the dream contains some bizarre element which would 
be impossible in waking (LaBerge, 1990b; LaBerge & Dement, 1982a; Levitan, 1992) or due to 
a particularly metacognitive state of awareness, such as that achieved by long-term meditators 
(Gackenbach et al., 1986; Hunt, 2000; Hunt & Ogilvie, 1989) – the realization must come in 
order for the dream to be “lucid” in the traditional sense. 
The results of this study demonstrated that waking mindfulness explained a significant 
amount of the variance in levels of dream mindfulness.  Importantly, recent mindful awareness, 
but not general levels of mindfulness were significantly and moderately related to dream 
mindfulness. Recent mindful awareness was also related to dream attention, reflection, volition, 
and self-awareness separately with a trend for higher dream control.  These results may be the 
most consistent of this study’s findings with respect to continuity theory.  They appear to match 
the model for temporal incorporation of waking experience into dreaming (i.e. more recent 
experiences have a higher rate of incorporation into dream content) and are conceptually as 
well as statistically related. 
Additional results from this study also lend support to the continuity theory of dreams.  
Specifically, Performance on neuropsychological measures of sustained attention, behavioral 
self-monitoring, change detection, and cognitive set shifting were also found to be related to 
dream cognitive function.  Without rehashing the specific pattern of these relationships, it 
appeared that there was some degree of consistency between performance on these measures 
and similar aspects of dream cognition.   
It was also found that lower levels of recent mindful acceptance were related to higher 
scores on the negative emotional intensity subscale of the DES-2.  This suggests that 
individuals who are more labeling and judgmental of their emotional experience tend to 
experience a greater intensity of negative emotions in their dreams.  The findings that nightmare 
frequency during the study, but not typical nightmare frequency prior to the study, was 
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correlated with recent levels of psychological acceptance also appear to support the idea that 
emotional concerns are continuous across waking and dreaming.  These findings are consistent 
with prior studies which have consistently demonstrated that emotional salience is an important 
factor affecting the incorporation of waking experience into dreams, with recent emotional 
concerns in waking being arguably the most reliable type of experience to be incorporated into 
dream content (Chivers & Blagrove, 1999; Delorme et al., 2002; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; Nielsen 
et al., 2004; Schredl, 2000). 
Limitations  
Specific Aim 1 
In an attempt to capture a range of lucidity, defined as “awareness in the dream state 
that one is dreaming,” (LaBerge, 1985a; Van Eeden, 1913), participants in this study were 
asked to rate “how close” they were to realizing they were dreaming during the dream on a ‘1’ to 
‘5’ scale.  It was explained to participants that a rating of ‘1’ would indicate the participant had 
no awareness that he or she was dreaming.  A rating of ‘2’ or ‘3’ would indicate that the 
participant had at least some fleeting recognition that the experience was dream-like (with 
higher ratings meaning a greater degree of recognition).  A rating of ‘4’ was reserved for “pre-
lucid” dreams in which the dreamer had a clear suspicion but not a full realization that he or she 
was dreaming, Ratings of ‘5’ were reserved exclusively for dreams in which the participant had 
full awareness that he or she was dreaming.   
There are several problems with the manner in which lucidity was assessed in this study.  
First, it is important to point out here that the concept of lucidity was novel to the majority of the 
participants in this study (only 36% had previously heard of lucid dreaming).  Also, the 
difference between a rating of ‘1’,‘2’, or ‘3’ is particularly ambiguous.  These issues probably 
reduced the sensitivity of the lucidity scale and, with it, the ability of the correlational analyses to 
detect a relationship between lucidity and mindfulness even if one exists.  Unfortunately, when 
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the scale was dichotomized by combining ratings of ‘1’ through ‘4’ into ‘non-lucid’ and ratings of 
‘5’ into ‘lucid’, the power of the correlation analysis was significantly reduced due to a shortage 
of ‘lucid’ ratings.  Furthermore, since participants’ ratings of “how close they were to realizing 
they were dreaming” was used as the primary measure of lucidity, it may be that the construct of 
‘awareness of dreaming while dreaming’ was not appropriately specified. 
Whether due to problems with the operational definition of lucidity or to the small number 
of lucid dreams in this study, this construct was not related to mindfulness in waking.  
Nonetheless, the null hypothesis that there is not a relationship between mindfulness skills in 
waking and lucidity in dreams cannot be rejected based on the results of this study and more 
research is needed to address this question. 
Specific Aim 2 
In addition to the problem with the measurement of lucidity discussed above, problems 
with the measurement of the Stroop effect may have reduced the ability of the present study 
design to accurately assess the relationships between performances on this task and ratings of 
dream lucidity.  The Stroop task used by Blagrove and colleagues (2010) required participants 
to correctly verbalize the color of the word in the incongruent condition, which is more consistent 
with the traditional administration of this task.  The authors also employed a computerized 
version of the task, but used a set of 40 stimuli compared with just 24 in the present study. The 
range of completion times for the incongruent trial in the present study was 12.96s to 69.58s 
with a mean of 28.58s (SD=10.98).  While Blagrove did not report this information for his 
sample, estimation of the average time to complete the incongruent trial is approximately 45s 
with an estimated standard deviation of 6s.  The difference in range of completion times could 
not be estimated however, but it can be speculated with reasonable confidence that it was more 
narrow than that of the present sample.  Given these factors, it appears that the PEBL version 
of the Victoria Stroop, administered in the manner described in the methods, was not sufficiently 
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sensitive to capture the Stroop effect.  Behavioral observations during testing also lend some 
support to this explanation, as it appeared that some participants had learned the key mappings 
better than others prior to beginning the task – likely introducing unwanted variance in scores. 
Specific Aim 3 
Problems with measurement of neuropsychological functions as described above may 
also have prevented the detection of relationships between performances on these measures 
and self-report mindfulness.  This is particularly true for the computerized versions of traditional 
neuropsychological measures of visual attention span (PEBL Corsi Block Test), behavioral self-
monitoring (PEBL Victoria Stroop Task), and cognitive set shifting (PEBL Trail Making Test part 
B).  This may be due to differences in the parameters of the computerized versus traditional 
administration.   
The failure to find any significant relationships between neuropsychological measures of 
visual attention span and any of the self-report mindfulness measures appears more likely to 
have been due to insufficient power as the result of the small sample size, a small effect size, or 
both.  Alternatively, it may be that the test did not adequately measure the construct in question, 
perhaps leading to a Type II error.  Since the precise reason for the negative finding cannot 
readily be determined, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and further investigation is 
necessary (see ‘Future Directions’).  Also, though the MAAS has previously been shown to be 
marginally correlated with Trails B performance (Ballantyne et al., 2010), the administration 
parameters for the Trails B trials in the present study were not comparable to this previous 
study, which may account for the discrepancy in results across the two studies. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This study sought to contribute to the research literature spanning the fields of 
psychological mindfulness, neuropsychology, sleep and dreaming.  The overarching aim was to 
investigate relationships between mindfulness in waking and lucidity in dreams.  Based on 
prevailing models of dream neuropsychology, most importantly the continuity hypothesis, the 
specific aims of this study were to investigate relationships between factors associated with 
mindfulness in waking and factors believed to be associated with lucidity in dreams.  Using a 
correlational design to test the hypotheses associated with each specific aim, a sample of N=44 
healthy participants were asked to complete tests of neuropsychological functioning and self-
report measures of mindfulness and dreaming.   
The results of this study suggest did not support the prediction that the constructs of 
waking mindfulness and dream lucidity would be related.  Several factors may have contributed 
to this negative finding including a restricted range of lucidity in the sample and possible 
misspecification of lucidity.  The null hypothesis, that waking mindfulness and dream lucidity are 
not related cannot be discounted.  However, the pattern of relationships demonstrated between 
other waking and dreaming variables suggests that the former explanation is more likely and 
that additional research is necessary to better clarify the precise waking correlates of lucidity.   
This study can provide some direction to future studies, suggesting that future studies on 
this topic should assess two components of mindfulness, acceptance and awareness.  It would 
also be advisable to investigate the potential relationships between other neuropsychological 
functions and lucidity, particularly executive and meta-cognitive functions such as prospective 
memory, planning, and inhibition.  Lucidity may be better characterized in a more direct manner 
as well.   
Despite the limitations of the study’s primary aim, a number of significant relationships 
between waking measures of mindfulness, associated neuropsychological functions, and dream 
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content were demonstrated and can also provide direction for future research.  Perhaps most 
notably, the three waking mindfulness measures used in this study accounted for a significant 
amount of the variance in dream mindfulness, the construct designed to capture a set of 
cognitive functions often associated with lucidity.  As subjective levels of mindful awareness in 
the week preceding the study were moderately associated with levels of dream mindfulness 
during the study, it appears plausible that this relationship represents continuity of the type and 
level of awareness between waking and dreaming.  It also seems reasonable to presume then, 
that mindfulness-based practices in waking may foster mindfulness in dreaming – a potential 
question for future research. 
It is worth mentioning that the relationship between dream mindfulness and dream 
lucidity was marginally significant and in the predicted direction.  Though further research with a 
larger sample of lucid dreams would be needed to better evaluate this relationship, it is 
interesting to note that within the summary measure of dream mindfulness, several ‘cognitive’ 
dream variables were significantly associated with lucidity ratings including dream attention and 
control.  Given these findings and prior research demonstrating that lucidity can arise by simply 
triggering a habitual state-test during REM sleep (e.g. NovaDreamer), it stands to reason that 
while dream mindfulness, dream attention, and dream control may be associated with lucidity, 
they are neither necessary for lucidity nor exclusively associated with lucid dreams.  In other 
words, it appears that one does not have to be a ‘mindful dreamer’ in order to be a lucid 
dreamer.  That said, it would be interesting to examine the similarities and differences between 
the content of lucid dreams which have been induced by externally triggered state-tests versus 
those which occur spontaneously or through some practice or combination of practices aimed at 
enhancing awareness in both waking and dreaming.   
Overall, the results appear to provide additional support for the hypothesis that the 
underlying brain-mind processes associated with waking and dreaming phenomena are shared, 
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at least with respect to many cognitive, emotional, and sensory functions.  Levels of mindfulness 
in waking, specifically recent levels of the awareness component of mindfulness, appear to be 
moderately continuous with the construct of dream mindfulness.  These findings in particular 
suggest that further investigation into the relationships between mindfulness in waking and its 
correlates in dreams is warranted. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for the PHLMS and MAAS 
 
PHLMS 
Awareness 
PHLMS 
Acceptance 
PHLMS 
Total 
MAAS 
Total 
Mean 38.32 29.34 67.66 61.57 
SD 4.91 6.57 8.04 8.99 
Min 23.00 14.00 37.00 38.00 
Max 48.00 47.00 90.00 80.00 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the two self-report measures of 
mindfulness administered to all N=47 participants who completed part 1 of the study.  PHLMS 
awareness and acceptance scores were used as measures of ‘recent mindful awareness’ and 
‘recent mindful acceptance’, respectively.  Total score on the MAAS were used as a measure 
of ‘general mindful awareness’. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for the PEBL Trail Making Test (pTMT) 
pTMT  
Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Trails A (Average Time) 46 19536.29 3298.55 13027.20 29823.60 
Trails B (Average Time) 47 24197.97 4951.42 15662.80 37630.80 
Trails A (Fastest Time) 47 17353.87 2670.65 11281.00 26026.00 
Trails B (Fastest Time) 47 20462.74 4681.24 11665.00 34455.00 
 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the PEBL Trail Making Test parts A 
and B.  This test was administered to all N=47 participants who completed phase 1 of the 
study.  Average completion times across all five trials of each part (Trails A Time and Trails 
B Time, above) and fastest completion times are shown in milliseconds. One data point was 
missing for the Trail Making Test Part A average completion time, due to a technical 
malfunction the values for this participant were not recorded.  Average completion time for 
Trails B was used as the measure of ‘cognitive set shifting’. 
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for the PEBL Corsi Block Test (pCBT) 
pCBT 
Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Block Span 46 6.02 1.34 4 9 
Total Score 45 52.96 22.74 20 126 
Total Correct 45 8.49 1.77 5 14 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the PEBL Corsi Block 
Test.  This test was administered to all N=47 participants who completed part 1 
of the study.  Due to a technical error, data from two participants were not 
recorded for the total score and total items correct and from one participant for 
block span.  Total score on this test was used as a measure of ‘visual attention 
span’. 
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for the PEBL Victoria Stroop Test (pSTRP) 
pSTRP Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Color Naming Time 47 26.50 7.18 17.27 51.35 
Word Reading Time 47 22.46 5.72 14.49 37.56 
Interference Trial Time 47 28.58 10.98 12.96 69.58 
Interference Trial Intrusions 47 0.79 1.21 .00 6.00 
Efficiency 
(Interference/Color Naming) 
47 1.08 0.24 .58 1.66 
Stroop Efficiency 
(Interference/Word Reading) 
47 1.26 0.27 .73 1.88 
 
 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the PEBL Victoria Stroop Test.  
This test was administered to all N=47 participants who completed part 1 of the study.  
Interference trial time was used as a measure of ‘behavioral self-monitoring’. 
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Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics for the PEBL Cued Flicker Paradigm Test (pCFPT) 
pCFPT Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Average RT  
(Un-Cued Trials) 
47 14938.21 4413.32 5498.44 26204.17 
Average RT  
(Correctly-Cued Trials) 
47 13290.03 4694.00 1638.77 24293.63 
Average RT  
(Falsely-Cued Trials) 
47 15342.62 3440.91 8626.38 26367.82 
Correct Responses 
(Un-Cued Trials) 
47 12.13 2.02 6.00 15.00 
Correct Responses 
(Correctly-Cued Trials) 
47 11.74 1.85 7.00 14.00 
Correct Responses 
(Falsely-Cued Trials) 
47 11.68 1.64 6.00 15.00 
Average RT 47 22944.21 4047.35 16698.76 31605.51 
Total Correct 47 35.55 4.19 19.00 41.00 
 
 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the PEBL Subliminally-
Cued Flicker Paradigm Test.  This test was administered to all N=47 participants 
who completed part 1 of the study.  Average response times (RT) across all trial 
types are shown in milliseconds.  The total number of correct responses was used 
as a measure of ‘change detection’.  
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Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics for the PEBL Psychomotor Vigilance Task (pPVT) 
pPVT Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Response Latency 
1000ms ISI 
47 393.21 74.51 267.00 664.31 
2000ms ISI 47 348.61 70.43 243.56 606.54 
3000ms ISI 47 322.71 58.31 245.13 533.10 
4000ms ISI 47 315.43 52.48 228.12 509.75 
5000ms ISI 47 310.20 52.20 232.55 468.56 
6000ms ISI 47 307.62 48.68 223.90 437.75 
7000ms ISI 47 307.26 49.67 232.07 420.50 
8000ms ISI 47 312.71 63.20 227.46 595.56 
9000ms ISI 47 301.37 52.74 231.63 512.75 
Mean Response Latency 
(all ISI bins) 
47 314.62 40.05 240.04 392.66 
SD of Response Latency 
(all ISI bins) 
47 70.05 29.98 30.85 205.54 
False Starts 47 4.33 3.75 .00 15.00 
Lapses 47 5.47 6.12 .00 28.00 
 
 
Note: Depicted are the descriptive statistical values for the PEBL Psychomotor Vigilance Task.  
This test was administered to all N=47 participants who completed part 1 of the study.  Response 
latencies across all inter-stimulus interval (ISI) bins are shown in milliseconds. 
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Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics for the Dream Experiences Survey v. 2 
Rating Scale  Night 1 Night 2 Night 3 Night 4 Night 5 Night 6 Night 7 
Recall 
Mean 3.54 3.46 3.27 3.36 3.15 3.13 3.22 
SD 1.00 1.12 1.20 0.96 1.04 0.89 1.48 
Overall 
Intensity 
Mean 2.46 2.37 2.37 2.67 2.30 2.25 2.56 
SD 0.90 1.07 1.22 1.24 1.03 1.06 1.13 
Lucidity 
Mean 2.61 2.46 2.39 2.54 2.40 1.88 2.33 
SD 1.26 1.19 1.12 1.31 1.43 0.89 1.22 
Visual 
Intensity 
Mean 3.73 3.63 3.29 3.41 3.80 3.31 3.22 
SD 0.95 1.16 1.42 1.23 1.11 1.20 1.56 
Auditory 
Intensity 
Mean 2.85 2.95 2.70 2.79 2.70 2.69 2.44 
SD 1.28 1.30 1.47 1.36 1.34 1.14 1.33 
Tactile 
Intensity 
Mean 2.37 2.46 2.49 2.51 2.70 2.13 2.67 
SD 1.30 1.40 1.53 1.27 1.45 1.36 1.66 
Taste/Smell 
Intensity 
Mean 1.37 1.68 1.75 1.72 1.55 1.50 1.11 
SD 0.86 0.99 1.26 0.89 1.00 0.73 0.33 
Vestibular 
Intensity 
Mean 2.76 2.59 2.46 2.92 2.90 2.81 2.56 
SD 1.26 1.32 1.38 1.36 1.59 1.22 1.42 
Happiness 
Mean 1.98 2.76 2.10 2.31 2.25 2.06 1.89 
SD 1.11 1.41 1.37 1.30 1.33 1.34 1.54 
Sadness 
Mean 2.46 2.10 1.98 2.08 2.25 2.44 1.44 
SD 1.27 1.34 1.42 1.29 1.59 1.41 1.33 
Anger 
Mean 2.27 2.07 1.73 2.36 2.00 2.44 1.44 
SD 1.38 1.37 1.28 1.33 1.52 1.31 1.33 
Fear 
Mean 2.93 2.20 2.13 2.44 2.80 2.56 2.22 
SD 1.37 1.42 1.51 1.45 1.58 1.41 1.64 
Confusion 
Mean 2.85 2.32 2.37 2.56 2.40 2.25 2.00 
SD 1.39 1.27 1.44 1.35 1.27 1.13 1.41 
Coherence 
Mean 3.10 3.15 2.80 2.69 2.90 3.19 2.44 
SD 1.20 1.24 1.40 1.06 0.91 1.22 1.24 
Attention 
Mean 2.95 2.85 2.63 2.67 2.65 2.94 2.78 
SD 1.12 1.35 1.22 0.98 1.42 1.06 1.30 
Volition 
Mean 2.80 2.68 2.34 2.59 2.65 2.81 2.67 
SD 1.12 1.31 1.41 1.07 1.50 1.38 1.58 
Control 
Mean 2.29 2.44 2.02 2.38 2.05 2.19 2.11 
SD 0.78 1.07 1.13 0.88 0.89 1.11 1.05 
Self-Awareness 
Mean 3.27 2.88 2.51 2.92 3.00 2.69 2.89 
SD 0.92 1.08 1.08 1.01 1.08 0.87 1.17 
Participation 
Mean 4.15 3.90 3.61 3.92 4.10 4.06 3.00 
SD 0.96 1.41 1.63 1.01 1.21 0.93 1.41 
Bizarreness 
Mean 2.63 2.39 2.56 2.79 2.85 2.56 2.22 
SD 0.97 1.16 1.27 0.98 1.31 0.96 1.30 
Note: Depicted are the average item ratings on the Dream Experiences Survey v. 2 by night.  Values reflect 
means and standard deviations for all 44 participants who completed part 2 of the study (night’s 1-4).  All items 
were 5-point Likert-type scales.  For nights 5-7, fewer participants completed the DES-2.  For hypothesis testing, 
item ratings were averaged across nights to produce one score per item for each participant. 
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Table 8:  Mindfulness and DES-2 Correlations 
DES-2 
Measure 
MAAS 
Total 
PHLMS 
Aware 
PHLMS 
Accept 
Intensity -.18
 
.09 .32* 
Visual -.05 .16 .07 
Auditory .00 -.11 .51*** 
Tactile -.04 .26* .14 
Taste/Smell -.15 .24 .02 
Vestibular -.23 .21 .15 
Sensory -.12 .22 .25 
Happiness .21 .16 -.16 
Sadness .02 .06 .36* 
Anger -.15 -.19 .37* 
Fear/Apprehension -.05 .16 .31* 
Confusion -.24 -.05 .24 
Negative Emotion -.10 .02 .40** 
Coherence .22 .22 -.29* 
Attention .29* .39** -.22 
Volition .18 .37** .15 
Control .01 .23 .04 
Reflection .07 .39** -.06 
Self-awareness .17 .32* -.15 
Participation .23 -.16 -.03 
Bizarreness -.24 .01 .06 
Lucidity -.05 .05 .05 
Dream mindfulness .18 .42** -.13 
*  p<.05 
**  p<.01 
*** p<.001 
 
Note:  Depicted are correlations between mindfulness measures and DES-2 variables.  Higher MAAS Total scores 
indicated of greater general mindfulness.  Higher PHLMS awareness subscale scores indicated greater recent 
mindful awareness.  Lower PHLMS acceptance scores indicated greater recent mindful acceptance.  For all DES-2 
scales, higher values indicated higher levels of that construct. 
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Figure 1: Mean Dream Mindfulness X PHLMS Awareness Subscale 
 
Note:  Depicted is the scatter plot of average dream mindfulness scores by PHLMS awareness scores 
with the linear least-squares regression line fit to the data. 
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Figure 2:  DES-2 Attention X PHLMS Awareness Subscale 
 
Note:  Depicted is the scatter plot of average ratings of dream attention on the DES-2 attention by PHLMS awareness 
scores with the linear least-squares regression line fit to the data. 
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Demographics Questionnaire
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Dream Experiences Survey v. 2  
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Appendix C:  The Mindful Awareness and Attention Scale 
This measure is in the public domain and can be found at: 
http://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/mindfulnessscale.pdf 
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Appendix D:  The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale 
This measure is in the public domain and can be found at: 
 http://theselfimprovementsite.com/tools/PhiladelphiaMindfulnessScale.pdf 
 
